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ternal management dilemmas. This Article elucidates how we
can better evaluate changes in our counter-terrorism laws and
policies—from warrantless NSA surveillance to massive military operations abroad—by scrutinizing the goals and internal
organizational problems of our adversaries. Conventional wisdom paints terrorist networks such as al Qaeda and state bureaucracies in advanced industrialized countries as starkly different. Al Qaeda and its allies are assumed to pose particularly
severe dangers because they are flexible, adaptable, decentralized, and staffed by committed supporters with a common goal.
By contrast, state bureaucracies in advanced industrialized nations are often described as suffering from plodding, rule-bound
decision-making structures that hobble their response to our
nimble adversary. But a closer look at al Qaeda’s own strategic
studies—read in light of social scientists’ emerging analyses of
terrorist organizations—reveals a more complex picture. In it,
the distinction between terrorist networks and bureaucratic
agencies is less pronounced than commonly supposed. Both entities face pervasive problems involving the harnessing of expertise, the resolution of conflict among politically important
players, reconciliation of competing goals, restraints on overzealous action, building public legitimacy, and monitoring subordinate activity. By scrutinizing terrorist networks as collective entities with conflicting goals facing evasive administrative
problems, we can better understand three things: (1) that, in
fact, terrorist networks have repeatedly sought to develop administrative procedures and law-like hierarchical arrangements to manage their problems; (2) that the efficacy of
counter-terrorism strategies depends crucially on the extent to
which such strategies exacerbate (at a reasonable cost) these
networks’ administrative problems; and (3) that legal arrangements characteristic of U.S. public law—particularly those governing the administrative decisions of bureaucratic institutions—are valuable in part because they assuage the very
problems that our terrorist adversaries are so desperately trying to solve.
∗∗∗
“By the grace of God, the organized Islamic work is beginning to
be managed on the highest administrative level . . . especially
the jihadi organizations. However there still needs to be more
mastery, general training, and advancement in order to encompass the greatest amount of the sectors of the Islamic movement,

CUELLAR_4FMT

1304

6/1/2007 11:24:07 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[91:1302

especially since we are approaching (by the permission of God) a
stage in which our administrative needs will be expanded in
what we have called the stage of the administration of savagery,
where we will mix with hundreds of thousands of people and
they will require the administration of regions from us as diminished governments. If we are not prepared to deal with that,
we will face dangerous problems, to say nothing of the harm
(that results from) random behavior or (from) a rigid management organization which stops action by its inflexibility and
prevents development and advancement.” 1
“Bureaucracies rationalize the problems and processes with
which they work, allowing them to develop systems . . . . That
system does not consist simply of rules and regulations. Rather,
the rules are accompanied by standards, practices, guidelines,
prototypes, models, and informal procedures, all shaped to some
extent by a general goal . . . .” 2

Americans lived through such a raft of changes in the halfdecade after the September 11 attacks that evaluating those
changes became a cottage industry in legal scholarship. Lawmakers entrusted the executive to manage sweeping new surveillance and war-fighting powers.3 When the executive
doubted whether Congress would convey even more powers for
surveillance, it implemented some tactics without congressional
authorization.4 The American military engaged in complex missions in Afghanistan and Iraq.5 It deposed brutal regimes, but
1. ABU BAKR NAJI, THE MANAGEMENT OF SAVAGERY 23 (William
McCants trans., Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Mil. Acad., 2006) (discussing al Qaeda leadership).
2. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 61–62 (1993).
3. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115
Stat. 224 (2001); Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002); Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act (Patriot Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272.
4. See infra Part III (discussing the administration’s policy of using the
National Security Agency for warrantless surveillance precluded by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, §§ 101–
111, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.)).
5. See generally MARTIN EWANS, CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN: STUDIES IN
ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 164–68 (2005) (discussing the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan); DAVID L. PHILLIPS, LOSING IRAQ: INSIDE THE POSTWAR RECON-
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thousands of American soldiers—and many tens of thousands
of foreign civilians—died in the process.6 U.S. intelligence organizations redoubled their efforts to track wire transfers and
enemy operatives, and became embroiled in a now infamous
tug-of-war with the White House about the justifications for
war in Iraq.7 Some of the nation’s most distinguished diplomats
staked their reputation on the strength of that intelligence.8
U.S. personnel detained thousands,9 abusing and killing some
of them in the course of interrogations,10 and rendering others
to regimes with established track records of torture and human
rights abuses.11 Courts began sorting through fundamental
questions—raised perhaps once in a generation—about the
scope of executive power,12 the role of international law in our
legal system,13 and the constitutional guarantees afforded to
detained individuals.14 Predictably, most of these developments
inspired considerable public debate.
But they were far from the only changes. A bit further from
the limelight, criminal justice bureaucracies achieved longsought changes in criminal statutes and deployed their im-

STRUCTION FIASCO 7–11 (2005) (discussing U.S. difficulties associated with the
invasion of and reconstruction of Iraq).
6. See, e.g., Erik Mink, Grasping for Answers as Iraq Unravels, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 24, 2006, at D11 (discussing estimates of civilian and
military deaths and casualties).
7. See generally COMM’N ON THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE
U.S. REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES 154–56 (2005) (criticizing the intelligence community’s
assessment of Iraqi programs allegedly involving weapons of mass destruction).
8. See, e.g., THOMAS E. RICKS, FIASCO: THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADVENTURE IN IRAQ 90–94 (2006) (discussing the weaknesses in the case thenSecretary of State Colin Powell presented to the United Nations regarding the
administration’s case for attacking Iraq).
9. See generally Diane Marie Amann, Abu Ghraib, 153 U. PENN. L. REV.
2085, 2088–89 (2005) (indicating there were almost 700 detainees at
Guantánamo and hundreds elsewhere).
10. See id. at 2092–93 (describing detainee abuse); Deaths of Detainees in
the Custody of U.S. Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2002 to 2005, http://
www.medscape.com/viewarticle/547787 (last visited Apr. 9, 2007) (accounting
for detainee deaths while in custody and describing causes of death).
11. See David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition: A
Human Rights Analysis, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 123, 129 (2006).
12. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2773–74 (2006) (balancing
executive and congressional power over the armed forces).
13. Id. at 2786.
14. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 524–25 (2004).
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mense breadth against alleged supporters of terrorism15 and
other targets.16 Executive branch officials prioritized secrecy in
response to Freedom of Information Act requests,17 environmental regulation,18 and immigration proceedings.19 Congress
gave regulators complex new authority to control cross-border
financial flows to disrupt money laundering and terrorist financing.20 And working in tandem, legislators and the President undertook the most significant transformation of the federal bureaucracy in a half-century, forging a sprawling new
Department of Homeland Security,21 a new intelligence oversight bureaucracy,22 and a new set of budget priorities reshaping the allocation of federal resources.23 Together, these developments paint a startling picture, in which nearly a halfcentury of legal changes has been crammed into sixty months.

15. See Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (containing
numerous substantive criminal law provisions); Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage
Shared by Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes of Passion, 92
CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1329 (2004) (“Although trumpeted as anti-terrorism legislation, it vastly expands police powers in terrorism and non-terrorism cases
alike. As some members of Congress have admitted, they voted for the legislation without having read it entirely.”). For the Department of Justice’s perspective on terrorism-related prosecutions and investigations associated with
the new Patriot Act passed in the wake of the attacks, see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT FROM THE FIELD: THE USA PATRIOT ACT AT WORK 2–5 (2004).
16. See Eric Lictblau, U.S. Uses Terror Law to Pursue Crimes from Drugs
to Swindling, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2003, at 1.
17. See Keith Anderson, Note, Is There Still a “Sound Legal Basis?”: The
Freedom of Information Act in the Post-9/11 World, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1605,
1620–24 (2003).
18. See Rena Steinzor, Democracies Die Behind Closed Doors: The Homeland Security Act and Corporate Accountability, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
641, 660 (2003).
19. See David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 961 (2002);
Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL
L. REV. 369, 373 (2006).
20. See Patriot Act, tit. III (outlining regulatory provisions governing
money laundering and terrorist financing). For a discussion of the significance
of these changes, see Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Mismatch Between
State Power and State Capacity in Transnational Law Enforcement, 22
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 15, 37–39 (2004).
21. See Dara Cohen et al., Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the
Political Design of Legal Mandates, 59 STAN. L. REV. 673, 696–700 (2006).
22. For an insightful analysis of this development, see Anne Joseph
O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing
Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1655, 1673–75 (2006).
23. See id. at 1667.
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My purpose here is not to dwell directly on these developments.24 Instead, this Article raises questions about how best to
assess legal change by mining an underappreciated vein of
knowledge about the organization of terrorist activity. In the
process, the Article contributes to an applied scholarly literature on national security law in the administrative state, and to
a more theoretical one concerned with the legal implications of
social science research on complex organizations.
The argument begins by engaging a familiar trope. Conventional wisdom suggests that terrorist networks such as al
Qaeda are quintessentially different from the complex national
security and regulatory bureaucracies charged with countering
the threat that terrorists pose.25 Discussions of the aforemen24. Although it is tempting to do so, most of those developments have
been the subject of substantial and often quite thoughtful commentary (including in some well-reasoned pieces appearing in this Symposium). On the other
hand, certain occurrences—particularly the significance of bureaucratic
changes, budget reforms, and criminal justice policies—have plainly received
less reflection than they merit. But see id.; Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative
Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663, 2669 (2005); David Zaring & Elena
Baylis, Sending the Bureaucracy to War, 92 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming May
2007) (manuscript at 11, on file with author).
25. See, e.g., Scott Canon, West Will Win War on Terror, Rumsfeld Assures
University, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 10, 2006, at A15.
[Rumsfeld, focusing on terrorism] described an effort that has battled
against an elusive enemy and labored to overcome bureaucratic and
political hurdles at home . . . . He said the military needs to transform
to a more agile force capable of changing tactics to deal with terrorists . . . . “The enemy has a brain,” he said. “They do things, and they
adjust.”
Id. Similar views are voiced by policy analysts outside government, as evidenced by the following statement from a well-placed observer of national security at a leading Washington, D.C. think-tank:
The threat we face from al Qaeda and other terrorist groups is one of
agile, non-bureaucratic adversaries who have the great advantage of
being on the offense—knowing where, when and how they will attack. . . . [T]errorist groups have always been nimble opponents that
were difficult to stop . . . . No security threat to the United States
matches this one. To fight this nontraditional threat, we must think
outside [the] box and try to be as nimble as the opponent (a difficult
task).
Protecting the Homeland: The President’s Proposal for Reorganizing Our
Homeland Defense Infrastructure, Before the Subcomm. on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, available
at http://judiciary.senate.gov/print_testimony.cfm?id=294&wit_id=667 (2002)
(statement of Ivan Eland, Director, Defense Policy Studies, Cato Institute). As
will emerge, reality is far more complicated. Although terrorists are adaptable,
they face considerable organizational problems in adapting. And while they
have partially decentralized (and some strategists would prefer even greater
decentralization), terrorist networks such as al Qaeda also find crucial bene-
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tioned changes are often clouded by seductive assumptions derived from that conventional wisdom: that our terrorist adversaries can be understood as nimble, endlessly adaptable actors
simultaneously able to capture the advantages of decentralization while functioning as a unitary actor motivated by a single
coherent goal.26 This Article shows this assumption to be profoundly misleading. Terrorist organizations are complex entities. They are enveloped in a multitude of organizational problems that necessarily make principled discussions of legal
responses to terrorism far more intricate than conventional
wisdom might suggest.

fits from hierarchy. See infra Part I.B.4. This has kept such organizations partially hierarchical even in the midst of protracted crises. In addition, both before and during such crises, some theorists believe the most crucial characteristics terrorist networks should develop are essentially those sometimes
considered to be outdated in some superficial observations of national bureaucracies, including law-like procedures, trained managers working as part
of a hierarchy, and monitoring mechanisms to mitigate agency problems. See
NAJI, supra note 1, at 23, 73–74; infra Part II.C. As used in this Article, the
term “terrorist network” refers to organized nonstate entities whose leaders
both desire and find it feasible to use a range of tactics including terrorist attacks.
26. For a sampling of presidential statements treating the terrorist threat
as one posed by a unitary actor with a single, coherent ideology, see The
President’s News Conference, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1877, 1880 (Oct.
25, 2006) (“Afghanistan was a front in this war against the terrorists. Iraq is
now the central front in the war against the terrorists. This war is more than
just finding people and bringing them to justice; this war is an ideological conflict between a radical ideology that can’t stand freedom, and moderate, reasonable people that hope to live in a peaceful society.”). For an example of a
scholarly paper modeling a terrorist organization as a unitary actor, see Paul
R. Pillar, Counterterrorism after al Qaeda, 27 WASH. Q. 101, 102 (2004);
Robert Powell, Defending Against Terrorist Attacks with Limited Resources
(Aug. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.wcfia.harvard
.edu/seminars/pegroup/Powelldefendaug05.pdf (providing an example of a scholarly paper modeling a terrorist group as a unitary actor). Pillar eloquently
emphasizes the “threat of decentralization” trope:
The small, secretive nature of terrorist plots and the indeterminate
nature of the target—likely to become an even greater problem as the
Islamic terrorist threat further decentralizes—have always made terrorism a particularly difficult target subject. . . . The danger now lies
in the fact that the looser the operational connections become and the
less Islamist terrorism is instigated by a single figure, the harder it
will be to uncover exploitable links and the more likely that the instigators of future terrorist attacks will escape the notice of U.S. intelligence. In a more decentralized network, these individuals will go unnoticed not because data on analysts’ screens are misinterpreted but
because they will never appear on those screens in the first place.
Pillar, supra, at 102–04.
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The alternative is not to forswear the instrumental analysis of counter-terrorism tactics. Instead, the key to any reasonable policy response lies in systematically examining the strategic dilemmas and organizational challenges confronting
terrorist networks such as al Qaeda. Terrorists, like drug cartels and legislatures, are a “they,” not an “it,” best understood
as organized entities facing some of the same institutional
problems that conventional state bureaucracies face.27 Though
animated by different strategic imperatives, leaders of terrorist
networks and managers of public agencies shoulder common
burdens. Their power depends on mitigating principal-agent
problems.28 They must harness expert knowledge, and they
yearn for a beguiling yet endlessly elusive synthesis of technocracy and political vision.29 Their power depends in part on fostering favorable public perceptions30 and adjudicating dis27. See infra Parts I, II.A. Although the focus of this case study is primarily on al Qaeda and its affiliates, other illicit nonstate actors (particularly
those interested in using terrorist tactics) are likely to face substantially similar organizational problems. The analysis therefore holds broader implications.
28. For a discussion of principal-agent problems, see Mathew McCubbins
& Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 171–73 (1984). For an insightful
analysis of how principal-agent problems distort the operations of terrorist
networks, see Jacob Shapiro, The Greedy Terrorist: A Rational-Choice Perspective on Terrorist Organizations’ Inefficiencies and Vulnerabilities, 4 STRATEGIC
INSIGHTS 1, 2 (2005); infra notes 156–57 and accompanying text (providing
examples of how al Qaeda strategists face principal-agent problems).
29. See NAJI, supra note 1, at 23 (“The mastery of the art of administration saves a lot of time and blesses the effort exerted (to acquire it), especially
since we are in a race against time and we need to undertake any effort in
such a way that we get the best results.”). For a similarly effusive exaltation of
technocratic ideals in the context of the American administrative state, see
BREYER, supra note 2, at 61–62. For critiques discussing the simultaneous allure of technocracy along with the impossibility of using technocracy to resolve
normative problems of administration, see generally Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276 (1984) (discussing the tension between administrative models founded on expertise and suggesting limits to agency actions); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975) (comparing administrative discretion with judicial controls on discretion).
30. See PETER BERGEN, THE OSAMA BIN LADEN I KNOW 392 (2006). Referring to top al Qaeda strategist Ayman al Zawahiri, Bergen notes, “Zawahiri
complained in his 2001 biography, Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner, that
the masses have not embraced al-Qaeda . . . . ‘The jihad movement must come
closer to the masses. We must win the people’s confidence, respect, and affection.’” Id. For discussions of the value of favorable public perceptions to administrative bureaucracies in advanced industrialized countries, see MarianoFlorentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411,

CUELLAR_4FMT

1310

6/1/2007 11:24:07 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[91:1302

putes.31 In short, both terrorist networks and conventional public agencies are burdened by some of the challenges routinely
managed by U.S. administrative law. While scrutinizing the
administrative problems of al Qaeda and analogous organizations is manifestly more challenging than merely restating
common assumptions about nonstate actors,32 this scrutiny will
reward scholars and policymakers with a host of valuable insights crucial to any defensible evaluation of post-September 11
legal changes.
My argument focuses on three insights in particular. First,
although circumstances have forced terrorist networks to adopt
a measure of decentralization, those networks have often
sought to build administrative procedures and law-like hierarchical arrangements to strike a balance between flexibility and
control and to mitigate the recurring organizational problems
associated with managing painfully scarce resources. Second,
policymakers should evaluate counter-terrorism policies on the
basis of whether they exacerbate terrorist networks’ ongoing
organizational challenges—challenges such as fostering public
approval and mitigating agency problems—at a reasonable
cost. Third, administrative arrangements characteristic of how
advanced industrialized democracies manage organizational
problems are valuable in part because they tend to manage
pervasive organizational problems more effectively than nonstate terrorist actors manage such problems. In contrast, a less
organization-focused evaluation of terrorist networks is likely
to emphasize simple but misleading assumptions over complexity,33 shorter-term tactical gains over gradual strategic pro495–97 (2005); infra note 134.
31. See LAWRENCE WRIGHT, THE LOOMING TOWER 134 (2006) (discussing
the problems faced by al Qaeda at its early stages of development as a result of
internal squabbles).
32. Compare The President’s News Conference, supra note 26, at 1880
(“[T]his war is an ideological conflict between a radical ideology that can’t
stand freedom . . . .”), with Martha Crenshaw, The Causes of Terrorism, 13
COMP. POL. 379, 385 (1981) (“As purposeful activity, terrorism is the result of
an organization’s decision that it is a politically useful means to oppose a government. . . . Terrorism serves a variety of goals, both revolutionary and
subrevolutionary. Terrorists may be revolutionaries[,] . . . minority separatists
combating indigenous regimes[,] . . . reformists[,] . . . anarchists or millenarians . . . or reactionaries acting to prevent change from the top.”).
33. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Emergencies and Democratic Failure, 92 VA. L. REV. 1091, 1099 (2006). Posner and Vermeule assume
that terrorist threats are best modeled as unexpected, exogenous shocks. Id. A
focus on the internal dynamics of terrorist organizations, however, reveals the
extent to which recruits and funding flow to such networks as a result of gov-
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gress,34 and worst-case scenarios about the threats posed by
terrorist networks rather than the considerable organizational
difficulties and trade-offs our terrorist adversaries face in carrying out their most lethal attacks.35
Peering inside a terrorist network may seem like a nearly
impossible task. After all, both experience (with the failures of
our own intelligence bureaucracies) and intuition (about terrorist networks’ incentives for secrecy) suggest that we can do little more than speculate about questions such as what al
Qaeda’s ultimate strategic objectives are and what organizational challenges it faces in achieving those objectives. Surprisingly, this turns out not to be the case. In the months and years
following September 11, senior al Qaeda strategists and sympathizers disseminated documents divulging the terrorist network’s aims and its internal management dilemmas.36 Some of
these documents have been posted on the Internet; others have

ernment policies. Hence, the assumption that terrorist shocks are entirely unpredictable and unrelated to domestic government policy, rather than endogenous to the settings where governments choose policies and terrorists solve
organizational problems may be unwarranted. Depending on the nature of the
security policy, it may actually help solve terrorists’ problems (e.g., if the costs
fall disproportionately on minorities from among which terrorist groups seek
to recruit, or if the alleged security policy—such as the invasion of Iraq—
makes it dramatically easier for the terrorist network to gain attention and
resources).
34. See id. (stating that “[a]s the benefits of security increase due to exogenous threats such as terrorism, a well-functioning government will supply
more security and less liberty, because the value gained from the increase in
security will exceed the value lost from the decrease in liberty,” without considering whether governments have the knowledge or motivation to provide
the right kind of “security” given the complexities of terrorist organizations).
35. See Jide Nzelibe & John Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design,
115 YALE L.J. 2512, 2533 n.56 (2006). The authors assume that “terrorist
groups like al Qaeda seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction, are more
likely to use them, and—because they have no population or territory to defend—may be immune to ‘traditional concepts of deterrence’ that permeate the
crisis bargaining model.” Id. Although the authors have reason to question
whether bargaining dynamics would play out the same way with ordinary nation-states and terrorist networks, the discussion elides organizational complexities that force terrorist networks to contend with calibrating the intensity
of their attacks, cultivating public support (and avoiding backlash), and trading off the investment of scarce resources in procuring or developing such a
destructive weapon compared to other imperatives. See generally BERGEN, supra note 30 (describing factors important to the development of al Qaeda); infra note 109 (providing additional discussion of how the mass public tends to
affect the incentives of terrorist networks).
36. See infra Part I.A.
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been recently declassified.37 When we examine these documents in the context of emerging political science literature on
the organizational dilemmas associated with terrorist activity,
these jihadi strategic studies (as some observers have christened them) provide a revealing portrait of al Qaeda’s goals. Al
Qaeda emerges as an organization that delegates power and
money to regional affiliates who carry out recruiting, terrorist
attacks, and political organizing.38 Though it is decentralized, it
appears still to have a coherent leadership structure and a
cadre of strategic thinkers to chart its future course.39 Both the
leadership and the strategists are bent on turning the organization into a social movement with broad appeal in the Muslim
world.40 In this quest they are aided by U.S. policies that provoke outrage among rank and file Muslims,41 and they are frustrated by the fact that some supporters have competing goals,
like getting rich.42
These realities play out in illicit terrorist organizations
that are unquestionably unique. Plainly, al Qaeda and its imitators differ in a host of ways from a bureaucratized nationstate, and even to some extent from previous insurgencies and
other illicit organizations.43 The irony is that scholars and poli37. See infra Part I.A.
38. See Lawrence Wright, The Master Plan, NEW YORKER, Sept. 11, 2006,
at 48, 50–51 (discussing the jihadists’ alleged decision to decentralize after the
September 11 attacks).
39. See NAJI, supra note 1, at 25 (discussing al Qaeda leadership); Al
Qaeda’s No. 2 Criticizes Bush and Pope in Video, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 30, 2006, at
12, available at 2006 WLNR 16955181 (describing a recent video by al Qaeda
leader Ayman al Zawahiri).
40. See COMBATING TERRORISM CTR., U.S. MILITARY ACAD., HARMONY
AND DISHARMONY: EXPLOITING AL-QA’IDA’S ORGANIZATIONAL VULNERABILITIES 52–54 (2006) [hereinafter HARMONY AND DISHARMONY], available at
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/Harmony%20and%20Disharmony%20--20CTC.pdf
(discussing al Qaeda’s continuing attempts to become a “social movement”);
Wright, supra note 38, at 51 (quoting Suri as declaring that “[a]l Qaeda is not
an organization, it is not a group, nor do we want it to be . . . it is a call, a reference, a methodology”).
41. See infra Part II.B.
42. See HARMONY AND DISHARMONY, supra note 40, at 11, 13 (“Preferences aren’t always aligned. When they are not, the covert nature of terrorist
groups necessarily implies that agents can take advantage of delegation to act
as they prefer, not as their principals would like.”).
43. See infra Part I.B.4 (describing the administrative law analogy). Al
Qaeda’s cavalier willingness to kill civilians is its most readily discernable distinction. Organizational polymorphism is a fact of life, affecting both the public agencies that enforce laws as well as the licit and illicit entities subject to
such enforcement. The point here is not to deny that fact, but to focus on
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cymakers can only fully grasp those distinctions, and their potentially subtle policy implications, after recognizing the extent
to which terrorist networks face a class of dilemmas that reflect—and sometimes even mirror—those of the Defense Department, the Food and Drug Administration, the National Intelligence Director, and United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations. Indeed, when the jihadi strategic studies are read
in the context of political scientists’ work on terrorist organizations, they reveal the extent to which terrorist networks confront problems that are analogous to those of our own administrative law.44 Common predicaments include delegating
executive and quasi-legislative powers to subordinate entities,
harnessing expertise, solving problems associated with participation and legitimacy, and adjudicating disputes. Although al
Qaeda strategists have been forced to manage their myriad of
internal administrative dilemmas without the precise equivalent of administrative law, some strategists have occasionally
identified the need to build the functional equivalent of bureaucratized, hierarchical, and even law-like structures to
manage their administrative problems.45 They have recognized
the devilish trade-offs between the flexible, decentralized structure that allegedly makes the organization so dangerous and
regularized procedures and more centralized hierarchy which
offer substantial benefits.
It may be tempting to ignore these parallels, but it is also
risky. In a world where conventional wisdom stresses the allegcommon organizational problems that can provide a more realistic picture of
terrorist networks as well as the public bureaucracies with which they interact. Id.; see also infra Part II.B (discussing differences between al Qaeda and
other insurgencies).
44. For present purposes, the term “administrative law” is used both in
the literal sense of a law-like system to solve administrative problems, which
substantially overlaps with (though is obviously different from) using the term
to describe the duties and functions of administrative law in the American
system. Administrative law is used in a manner that encompasses procedural
mechanisms not ordinarily considered part of administrative law but reflecting substantially similar goals of mitigating arbitrary action by organizations.
FISA’s judicial review provisions are an example of the latter category. See
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (1993) (discussing the effect of convergence between law and social, economic, and political norms on the implementation of legal rules); infra Part III.
45. In some cases, al Qaeda’s leaders have actually implemented law-like
arrangements to legitimize internal control decisions. See BERGEN, supra note
30, at 124–25 (discussing al Qaeda’s use of Sharian courts to legitimize the decision to execute the son of one of the organization’s leaders after the son was
discovered spying on the group).
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edly unique flexibility and post-modern structure of al Qaedatype terrorist organizations,46 citizens and policymakers would
do well to recognize some of the parallels between our own established institutions and these nascent ones. The more we begin to see al Qaeda and its counterparts as entities struggling
to solve their internal administrative law-related dilemmas,
the better we can understand how to disrupt their efforts.
And there may be a subtler, but no less important, implication. In the process of adopting a more nuanced perspective on
the organization of terrorist networks, citizens and policymakers may also better appreciate how administrative arrangements help advanced industrialized nations forge reasoned responses to a wide variety of threats, whether they arise from
food adulteration, environmental degradation, or terrorist attacks. Inasmuch as organizational success depends on managing agency problems, generating information, securing legitimacy and participation, and adjudicating disputes, citizens and
policymakers should understand strategic conflicts in part as a
contest between dueling systems of administrative law. The
United States should evaluate counter-terrorism policies in
part based on how they affect those systems. Hence, when
Americans evaluate the implications of presidential decisions to
sidestep the literal terms of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,47 they would do well to focus on more than just the
short-term tactical implications of the President’s decision.
They should also weigh the price of interfering with an institutional arrangement designed to mitigate the same type of internal management problem that terrorist networks are themselves struggling to overcome.
The argument unfolds in three parts. Part I seeks to peer
inside a terrorist network by examining jihadi strategic studies,
al Qaeda documents captured and recently declassified, and political science research on the organization of terrorist activity.
It also identifies four recurring themes that emerge from these
sources and that appear to epitomize the behavior of insurgent
networks committed to using terrorist tactics. Part II explores
46. See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT 71 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT] (describing a “new kind of terrorist organization”). But see Martha Crenshaw,
Counterterrorism in Retrospect: Chronicle of a War Foretold, 84 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 187, 189, 193 (2005) (criticizing the idea that al Qaeda represents a
“new” kind of terrorism).
47. FISA of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, §§ 101–111, 92 Stat. 1783, 1801
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
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the implications of the preceding analyses and the potential
relevance of these implications for evaluating legal and policy
responses to terrorism. Part III demonstrates that this exercise
enables us to understand the extent to which strategic conflict
is partly a contest among competing systems of administrative
law (broadly defined), each seeking to solve internal agency, information, participation, and adjudication problems endemic to
both complex nonstate actors and state bureaucracies.
I. PEERING INSIDE A TERRORIST NETWORK
No event in recent history so vigorously forced the machinery of the federal government into overdrive as the September
11 attacks. Within hours of the terrorist strikes, Washington
was a flurry of activity.48 Executive branch officials held countless emergency meetings, made spirited public statements, executed complex diplomatic maneuvers, and took part in urgent
internal discussions about how to respond.49 The same was true
thousands of miles away in Afghanistan, where the Taliban regime had been sheltering al Qaeda for years. At the same time
that congressional leaders and the Bush administration were
gearing up for legal and policy changes in the United States, al
Qaeda’s Kabul storefront office was brimming with activity.50
Operatives, recruits, and organizers braced for the American
response. Anticipating the imminent reprisal attack, the organization put together a propaganda video entitled “The Big
Job.”51 Meanwhile, Osama bin Laden wrote a long email to
Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban government hosting al
Qaeda, seeking simultaneously to reassure the Taliban about
what would come next and to strengthen their decision to tolerate it:
I would like to emphasize the major impact of your statements on the
Islamic world. Nothing harms America more than receiving your
strong response to its positions and statements. Thus it is very important that the Emirate respond to every threat or demand from America . . . with demands that America put an end to its support of Israel,
and that U.S. forces withdraw from Saudi Arabia. Such responses
nullify the effect of the American media on people’s morale . . . . Their
threat to invade Afghanistan should be countered by a threat on your
48. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 46, at 35–36.
49. Id.
50. See Alan Cullison, Inside Al-Qaeda’s Hard Drive, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Sept. 2004, at 55, 58, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/print/
200409/cullison.
51. See id. at 68.
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part that America will not be able to dream of security until Muslims
experience it as a reality in Palestine and Afghanistan . . . . Keep in
mind that America is currently facing two contradictory problems: a)
If it refrains from responding to jihad operations, its prestige will collapse, thus forcing it to withdraw its troops abroad and restrict itself
to U.S. internal affairs. This will transform it from a major power to a
third-rate power, similar to Russia. b) On the other hand, a campaign
against Afghanistan will impose great long-term economic burdens,
leading to further economic collapse, which will force America, God
willing, to resort to the former Soviet Union’s only option: withdrawal
from Afghanistan . . . .52

Mullah Omar was not the only one needing reassurance.
Within al Qaeda, the response to the attack’s success was
mixed. Some al Qaeda members expressed deep concern for
how the U.S. response would affect the jihadi movement. Abu
Musab al Suri, a member of the terrorist organization’s inner
leadership and a theorist of jihad, had sparred with bin Laden
before about the potential risks of high-profile operations. “I
think our brother has caught the disease of screens, flashes,
fans, and applause,” he wrote in an email to bin Laden in 1999,
complaining about the al Qaeda leader’s penchant for prioritizing attacks generating high-profile publicity over the difficult
work of running the training camps and smoothing over relations with the Taliban.53 Now, Suri had reason to fear that the
September 11 attacks would imperil the rule of the Taliban,
and the Taliban’s control of Afghanistan was central to the
movement’s future because it provided a place to organize and
train new recruits.54 By June 2002, even bin Laden’s son
Hamzah had posted messages on an al Qaeda website lamenting al Qaeda’s post-September 11 situation.55 In response to
these challenges—furtively exchanging messages online and
occasionally meeting in secluded corners of Central Asia—the
organization’s strategic thinkers set about recapturing the

52. Id. at 70.
53. Wright, supra note 38, at 48, 50.
54. Id. at 48.
55. Id. Bin Laden’s son exclaimed: “Oh, Father! Where is the escape and
when will we have a home? Oh, Father! I see spheres of danger everywhere I
look. . . . Tell me, Father, something useful about what I see.” Id. Bin Laden
apparently replied: “Oh, son! Suffice to say that I am full of grief and
sighs. . . . I can only see a very steep path ahead.” Id. Then, trying to dissipate
the link between the September 11 attacks and the organization’s present
challenges, Bin Laden laments that “[a] decade has gone by in vagrancy and
travel, and here we are in our tragedy. Security has gone, but danger remains.” Id.
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group’s momentum and renewing its institution-building project.56
A. CONTEXT AND METHODS
The arguments unleashed within al Qaeda after the September 11 attacks richly emphasize the dangers of treating a
terrorist network as a monolithic entity, impervious to organizational challenges, and enjoying a bountiful supply of members guided by a single purpose. With a more textured image of
terrorist networks, key players shaping national security policy
would find it harder to ignore the value of peering inside a terrorist network. Scholars and analysts would find it more difficult to dismiss the insights to be gleaned from closely observing
al Qaeda’s goals, its approach to weighing the costs and benefits of choosing between truck bombs or time bombs, its canonical texts and political debates, its internal compromises, and its
plans for appealing to the public. Domestic political realities
playing out within advanced industrialized countries sometimes discourage legislators and executive branch officials from
fully appreciating the complexities of their terrorist adversaries.57 But facing a complex adversary with competing goals and
a range of subtle weaknesses and strengths, politicians are almost foolish to ignore what leaders and strategists of terrorist
networks actually say, what social scientists have gradually
come to understand about the internal strategies of nonstate
actors, and what these statements and conclusions reveal about
our adversary’s internal organizational challenges and its
strategies to address these challenges.58
This is precisely the strategy that the nation’s terrorist adversary has pursued. Its thinkers are hard at work scrutinizing

56. See Jarret M. Brachman & William F. McCants, Stealing Al-Qaeda’s
Playbook, 29 STUDIES CONFLICT & TERRORISM 309, 309–11 (2006); Cullison,
supra note 50, at 64; Wright, supra note 38, at 50–51.
57. See Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Politics and the Suboptimal Provision
of Counterterror, 61 INT’L ORG. 9, 9–11 (2007) (discussing the potentially
suboptimal provision of counter-terrorist policy); Cuéllar, supra note 20, at 44–
48 (discussing the potentially diverging incentives of politicians and the public
in the context of transnational security and law enforcement policy); Mark
Schlesinger & Richard R. Lau, The Meaning and Measure of Policy Metaphors,
94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 611, 611–14 (2000) (indicating how politicians have an
incentive to simplify the discussion of complicated issues).
58. See BERGEN, supra note 30, at 392 (“One of the lessons of September
11 is that we should pay careful attention to what the jihadists are actually
saying.”).
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Western management texts and Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and
Fall of the Great Powers.59 Regarding the importance of understanding Western administrative practices and political behavior, one strategist said this:
We urge that most of the leaders of the Islamic movement be military
leaders or have the ability to fight in the ranks, at the very least.
Likewise, we also urge that those leaders work to master political science just as they would work to master military science.60 We can say
that bargaining is a characteristic of the politics of the enemy because
the substitute for successful bargains between them—even if they
achieve some partial gains—is continuous war which might crush all
of (their) interests.61

And while an important goal in studying Western practices
closely is to understand the weaknesses of those practices, the
terrorist networks’ strategists also emphasize the value of leveraging technocratic Western ideas about how to solve administrative challenges—challenges that are likely to prove increasingly critical to al Qaeda.62
Al Qaeda’s thinkers have good reason to focus on understanding their adversaries. Al Qaeda’s goals are ambitious and
its resources are scarce. Its adversaries are complex and capable at times of tremendously nimble feats; yet, they also face
substantial practical and political obstacles.63 Some of the terrorist network’s recurring internal challenges—involving
agency problems, filling gaps in information, and adjudicating
disputes—have analogues in advanced industrialized countries, and even turn out to be the province of an elaborate
body of administrative law imposing non-arbitrariness re-

59. See Brachman & McCants, supra note 56, at 310.
60. NAJI, supra note 1, at 37–38.
61. Id. at 38.
62. Id. at 23 (“We must make use of books on the subject of administration, especially the management studies and theories which have been recently published, since they are consonant with the nature of modern societies.
There is more than one site on the Internet in which one can obtain management books.”). The strategists betray little awareness of the complexities associated with how larger political, economic, legal, and social circumstances
combine to both shape the production of the Western management practices
they lionize, as well as shape the conditions potentially allowing such practices
to be instrumentally effective. For an interesting discussion of how macro-level
social forces and legal practices shape the administration of organizations in
the Middle East, see Timur Kuran, Why the Middle East is Economically Underdeveloped: The Historical Mechanisms of Institutional Stagnation, 18 J.
ECON. PERSP. 71, 82–83 (2004).
63. See infra Part I.B.
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quirements and managing public participation.64 Policymakers in advanced industrial democracies would be ill-advised to
neglect a symmetrical opportunity to scrutinize terrorist networks’ organizational life. Such neglect would almost certainly
diminish policymakers’ capacity to mitigate the dangers that
some terrorist networks pose, while also limiting society’s capacity to evaluate the strategies justified in the name of disrupting terrorism.
To counter the existing dearth of attention to organizational problems in prevailing evaluations of counter-terrorism
strategies, the sections that follow scrutinize strategic documents and studies produced by al Qaeda strategists and sympathizers. This scrutiny sheds light on the organization’s goals
and its internal administrative dynamics. I focus particularly
on Abu Bakr Naji’s book-length study, entitled The Management of Savagery, because of the unparalleled volume of details
it provides about jihadi terrorist networks’ goals and challenges, and because it was published through Sat al-Jihad, the
main organ of al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia.65 I also draw from accounts of three other works described by some leading al Qaeda
observers as authentic and influential jihadi strategic studies
describing the thinking of al Qaeda affiliates. These include a
long tract by Abu Musab al-Suri entitled Call for Worldwide Islamic Resistance;66 Ayman al Zawahiri’s Knights Under the
Prophet’s Banner;67 and a book entitled Al Zarqawi: The Second
Generation of al Qaeda, by radical Jordanian journalist Fouad
Hussein, which is based on sympathetic interviews with individuals such as the late Abu Musab al Zarqawi (the former
leader of al Qaeda in Mesopotamia) and al Qaeda security chief
64. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59 (2006)
(providing, among other things, for notice and comment in the context of most
regulatory rulemaking proceedings, and subjecting administrative action to
review against arbitrariness).
65. See Wright, supra note 38, at 52, 56; Combating Terrorism Ctr., Abu
Bakr Naji’s THE MANAGEMENT OF SAVAGERY (2005) (unpublished document
on file with author).
66. See id. at 50.
67. The translation of al Zawahiri’s book-length analysis of al Qaeda’s
goals and strategies consulted here is included in LAURA MANSFIELD, HIS OWN
WORDS: TRANSLATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE WRITINGS OF DR. AYMAN AL
ZAWAHIRI (INCLUDES KNIGHTS UNDER THE PROPHET’S BANNER AND SELECTED
POST SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 COMMUNIQUÉS AND MESSAGES) (2006). Al Zawahiri
is “widely credited with being the brains behind the terror infrastructure of Al
Qaeda.” Id. at 13. Al Zawahiri’s analysis was initially serialized in a Middle
Eastern newspaper in December 2001. Id. at 13–14.
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Saif al Adl.68 To place these sources in context, I have also
drawn from a growing cache of declassified al Qaeda documents
translated and analyzed by the Combating Terrorism Center at
the United States Military Academy,69 and from political scientists’ studies (which in turn reflect qualitative, game-theoretic,
or quantitative analyses) of the organization of terrorist networks.70
It is natural to question whether such studies genuinely reflect al Qaeda’s position. Given the reality that al Qaeda is an
organization subject to internal disagreement and political
competition, it is more accurate to say that these sources are
likely to reflect what some of the organization’s key strategists
are thinking.71 Al Qaeda factions jockey for support within the
organization and for recruits outside it. In doing so, they are
almost certainly drawn to articulating visions in written documents—much like political parties or government agencies in
advanced industrial democracies develop written justifications
for their own policies.72 In some cases, the materials have been
posted in known al Qaeda websites by individuals long known
to have authored previous works published by the terrorist network.73 In other cases (as with some of the declassified sources),
documents have been captured directly from al Qaeda operatives.74 Sometimes the sources provide insight into internal dis68. See Wright, supra note 38, at 56–57; Souad Mekhennet & Michael
Moss, In Lebanon Camp, A New Face of Jihad Vows Attacks on U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 16, 2007, at A1.
69. See HARMONY AND DISHARMONY, supra note 40, at 2–3.
70. See infra notes 71–75 and accompanying text.
71. The claim is not that these studies are representative, in a statistical
sense, of what a random member of al Qaeda’s leadership would think. A large
study of available al Qaeda-related documents could prove revealing in many
ways, though making inferences from such an analysis might prove tricky
given the selection problems affecting the documents presently available. Instead, my goal here is to focus on some of the works that experts consider to be
indicative of the major strands of thinking among some of al Qaeda’s key
strategists, to place them in context by referring to a larger body of captured al
Qaeda documents and political science research, and to use the process as an
opportunity for gaining some insights (and generating theories) about the role
of law-like administrative arrangements in strategic conflict.
72. Cf. Brachman & McCants, supra note 56, at 309 (“Jihadi leaders are
surprisingly frank when discussing the vulnerabilities of their movement and
their strategies for toppling local regimes and undermining the United States.
Their candor is, in large part, a consequence of struggles for leadership within
the movement . . . .”).
73. See Wright, supra note 38, at 53, 56 (discussing the provenance of Abu
Bakr Naji and his likely role as a leading al Qaeda strategist).
74. See HARMONY AND DISHARMONY, supra note 40, at 2.

CUELLAR_4FMT

2007]

6/1/2007 11:24:07 AM

AL QAEDA’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

1321

agreements within al Qaeda in particular, and among supporters of the jihadi movement more generally. Some favor more
regionally focused goals culminating in the control of territory
in the Middle East, while others (particularly some of Hussein’s
sources) seek an eventual “clash of civilizations” with the
West.75 In other domains, however, there is considerable overlap—even remarkable agreement—among these sources, and
the themes evident therein also prove remarkably consistent
with the analyses in political scientists’ accounts of the logic of
terrorist organizations.76
B. THEMES EVIDENT IN JIHADI STRATEGIC STUDIES
1. Western Resolve and Imperial Overstretch
Organizations nearly always claim to have a purpose.77 For
example, some public bureaucracies ostensibly aim to protect
the environment through regulatory policies, while some clandestine insurgent groups claim responsibility for casting off the
yoke of a brutal colonial occupation. To understand any collective entity which claims for itself the mission to accomplish
particular goals, one should know something about its alleged
objectives.78
Jihadi strategists repeatedly place among their most important strategies to carefully manage public reactions in
Western democracies. In particular, the strategists see opportunity in the risks to the United States and its Western allies of
what could be termed imperial overstretch, where the burdens
of commanding the affairs of distant lands begins to weaken
the government and the economy. This trope bears some resemblance to the account Paul Kennedy provides in The Rise
and Fall of the Great Powers, in which empires crumble because of the staggering financial, geostrategic, and logistical
75. See Wright, supra note 38, at 57–59 (discussing differences between
the more nationalistic activists focused on securing control of Arab countries,
and comparing their purpose to the dark utopian vision of conflict in Hussein’s
book).
76. See supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text.
77. See JAMES G. MARCH & HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 22 (2d ed.
1993) (“Roles in organizations, as contrasted with many of the other roles that
individuals fill, tend to be highly elaborated, relatively stable, and defined to a
considerable extent in explicit and even written terms.”).
78. This is not the same as assuming those objectives fully explain what
organizations actually seek to do. See generally Cohen et al., supra note 21, at
702–12.
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burdens of maintaining their imperial capabilities.79 A second
and related theme is the goal of making Western republics sufficiently sensitive to these burdens to provoke a political demand for disengagement from the Muslim world. They find historical support for this possibility in the U.S. experience with
Vietnam and Somalia, and Soviet Russia’s debacles in Afghanistan. In one jihadi strategic tract, Abu Bakr Naji makes these
points by quoting Paul Kennedy himself:
When a state submits—whatever the extent of its ability—to the illusion of the deceptive power and behaves on this basis, that is when its
downfall begins. It is just as the American author Paul Kennedy says:
“If America expands the use of its military power and strategically extends more than necessary, this will lead to its downfall.” This overwhelming power is also assisted by the cohesion [tamasuk] of the society in the central country and the cohesion of that society’s
institutions and sectors. The overwhelming military power (weapons,
technology, fighters) has no value without the cohesion of society and
the cohesion of (society’s) institutions and sectors. But this overwhelming military power may become a curse to this great superpower if the cohesion of society [literally “the social entity”] collapses.80

Bin Laden’s aforementioned email to Mullah Omar immediately after the September 11 attacks voices similar hopes to
[a]ttempt to cause a rift between the American people and their government, by demonstrating the following to the Americans: That the
U.S. government will lead them into further losses of money and
lives. That the government is sacrificing the people to serve the interests of the rich . . . . That the government is leading them to the war
front to protect Israel and its security. America should withdraw from
the current battle between Muslims and Jews.81

While the strategists sometimes differ in the extent to
which they believe imperial overstretch to be essentially inevitable, they often highlight the importance of undertaking violent resistance operations that will encourage Westerners to
tire of involvement in the Middle East and the Muslim world.82
They also highlight an additional benefit of the controlled use
of violence: it helps to puncture the myth that Western forces
79. See PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS 100
(1987) (discussing the weaknesses of the French and Russian empires).
80. NAJI, supra note 1, at 7.
81. Cullison, supra note 50, at 70.
82. NAJI, supra note 1, at 38 (“As for [the Americans’] persistence in continuing war, that is only when they think that their opponent is weak and it is
possible to crush his will. When there is violent resistance which leads to invasions that cost a great deal and are of little use, the factions of the coalition
began to withdraw one after another preferring (their own) security or delaying the conflict until more suitable circumstances.”).
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generally, and the United States in particular, are invincible.83
Thus, in an argument that echoes game theorists’ identification
of prisoners’ dilemma problems facing those who might resist
authorities that have greater power,84 Naji notes:
There is no doubt that the power which God gave to the two superpowers (America and Russia) was overwhelming in the estimation of
humans. However, in reality and after careful reflection using pure,
human reason, one comes to understand this power is not able to impose its authority from the country of the center—from America, for
example, or Russia—upon lands in Egypt and Yemen, for example,
unless these (latter) countries submit to those powers entirely of their
own accord. It is correct that this power is overwhelming and that it
seeks help from the power of local regimes controlled by proxies who
rule the Islamic world. Yet all of that is not enough (to completely
control the satellite states). Therefore, the two superpowers must resort to using a deceptive media halo which portrays these powers as
non-coercive and world-encompassing, able to reach into every earth
and heaven as if they possess the power of the Creator of creation.85

Al Zawahiri sounds a similar theme in Knights Under the
Prophet’s Banner, noting the extent to which Western powers
work through local allies inveigled by the appearance of power:
We need to admit that successful attempts have been made to infiltrate our ranks, that these attempts have attracted some of our
prominent names, and our enemies have added them to the crowds
that serve their purposes, including the writers of falsehoods, those
who exploit principles for personal gain, and those who sell their fatwas (religious rulings) as commodities.86

Because the Afghan experience punctured the myth of superpower invincibility, it was incredibly valuable to the jihadi
movement.87 Imperial overstretch, characterized by crumbling
Western resolve and diminished perceptions of invincibility resulting from attacks in the Middle East, yields a toxic brew
that strategists can use to undermine Western objectives and to
acquire converts and territory. The organization must garner
sufficient resources, supporters, and administrative capacities
83. Id. at 9.
84. Cf. Barry R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and
the Rule of Law, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 245, 245 (1997) (modeling a “game theory approach to . . . political officials’ respect for political and economic rights
of citizens”).
85. NAJI, supra note 1, at 7.
86. MANSFIELD, supra note 67, at 20.
87. Id. at 38 (“A further significant point was that the jihad battles in Afghanistan destroyed the myth of a superpower in the minds of the Muslim mujahideen young men. The USSR, a superpower with the largest land army in
the world, was destroyed and the remnants of its troops fled Afghanistan before the eyes of the Muslim youths and as a result of their actions.”).
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to calibrate its tactics and to survive long enough to reap the
reward of the West’s imperial overstretch, which brings us to
the next theme.
2. Protecting Organizational Survival
Save in the rarest of circumstances, conflict over means,
ends, or decision-rules is an inevitable byproduct of collective
decision making.88 Just as members of the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Federal Election Commission often
disagree about the proper content of a regulatory rule, al Qaeda
strategists do not agree on everything. For example, Suri differs from other writers because he believes the organization
should largely eschew high-profile attacks against Western
targets.89 His concern is borne largely from a desire for the survival of the movement to which he is so profoundly devoted and
from experiences where that movement faced collapse because
of meager financial resources, captured leaders, relentless
pressure at the hands of intelligence agencies, and the lack of
territory from which to organize and recruit.90
On the other hand, the disagreements are only partial. Although other strategists are somewhat more willing to contemplate attacks against Western targets (particularly if they have
the appealing quality of fomenting exhaustion rather than outrage among the Western public), they tend to share Suri’s concern for organizational survival. Despite Naji’s relatively
greater willingness to sacrifice secrecy for some of the benefits
of a more hierarchical bureaucracy,91 he shares Suri’s view
about the need to focus on organizational survival by learning
from the past:
In the beginning of the Afghani war in the [19]70s . . . the jihad went
through critical periods in which a number of strikes were directed
88. See MARCH & SIMON, supra note 77, at 132–56; Terry M. Moe, The
New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 739, 758–65 (1984).
89. See Wright, supra note 38, at 51 (“Unlike most jihadi theorists, Suri
acknowledges the setback caused by September 11. He laments the demise of
the Taliban, which he and other Salafi jihadists considered the modern world’s
only true Islamic government.”).
90. See MANSFIELD, supra note 67, at 201 (“Victory by the armies cannot
be achieved unless the infantry occupies the territory. Likewise, victory for the
Islamic movements against the world alliance cannot be attained unless these
movements possess an Islamic base in the heart of the Arab region.”); NAJI,
supra note 1, at 61 (discussing the value of territory); Wright, supra note 38,
at 50 (discussing how poorly the movement was doing in the early to mid
1990s).
91. See NAJI, supra note 1, at 63.
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against the mujahids, until—according to some accounts—only thirty
men remained. However, . . . after . . . a decade of confrontation with
the regime . . . the jihad offered up one and a half million martyrs . . . . Where did these numbers of people come from? The response
is that it happened by means of leading the masses to the battle and
turning them into an army, especially when we established regions
that were secure from the chaos and savagery that resulted from
fighting and the people emigrated to these regions. We can make
these regions theaters for proselytizing, training, and education.92

Naji’s exhortation to turn adversity into opportunity is
similarly reflected in the efforts made by al Zarqawi’s organization in Iraq to learn from the mistakes of the al Tali’a movement in Syria.93 Al Tali’a’s experience in Syria, for example,
taught the brash entrepreneur of terrorism that organizational
survival depended in part on the existence of a media and political arm to complement war-fighting.94
Suri, al Zarqawi, and Naji were not alone in seeking to protect the organizational viability of the jihadi movement by extracting lessons from previous failures. Zawahiri also dwells on
the critical imperative of learning from past mistakes in order
to protect organizational survival, focusing particularly on ostensible allies of the jihadi movement that instead “stabbed . . .
[it] . . . in the back.”95 And echoing recent empirical work in political science emphasizing the importance of geography to the
success of insurgencies, Zawahiri notes that:
The problem of finding a secure base for jihad activity in Egypt used
to occupy me a lot, in view of the pursuits to which we were subjected
by the security forces and because of Egypt’s flat terrain which made
government control easy, for the River Nile runs in its narrow valley
between two deserts that have no vegetation or water. Such a terrain

92. Id. at 62.
93. See HARMONY AND DISHARMONY, supra note 40, at 37.
94. See id. Other jihadi strategists, including Naji, agree about the importance of political activity as being central to organizational survival. See NAJI,
supra note 1, at 37 (“If we meditate on the factor common to the movements
which have remained, we find that there is political action in addition to military action.”).
95. MANSFIELD, supra note 67, at 46 (“The Islamic movement in Egypt,
even though it made an effort against the enemies of Islam in the past, its
general line was not against the ruling regime but against the external enemy.
The movement’s ideology and media continued to try to get close to the head of
the ruling regime (the king) and to recognize him as the legitimate authority
in the country. This arbitrary separation between the external enemies and
their internal agents led to many disasters and setbacks because the movement’s members faced their enemy with their chests but left their backs exposed to his ally. Thus, they were stabbed in the back on the orders of those
whom they faced with their chests.”).
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made guerrilla warfare in Egypt impossible and, as a result, forced
the inhabitants of this valley to submit to the central government and
be exploited as workers and compelled them to be recruited in its
army.96

The September 11 attacks did nothing to diminish the imperative of organizational survival. The survival imperative
was intensely apparent in the hectic days following the September 11 attacks, as operatives and leaders responded to
American pressure and eventually decided to further decentralize the organization.97 One should expect concerns about organizational survival to be both profound and stable. While al
Qaeda has produced its share of suicidal violence, the conclusion that it is a suicidal organization is profoundly deceiving.
Indeed, the organizations involved in recruiting, preparing, and
fielding suicide bombers tend to exhibit a long-term, even
quasi-rational, regard for their own survival which is essential
to creating the elaborate infrastructure which supports suicide
bombing campaigns.98 More generally, players within organizations such as al Qaeda have both politically instrumental and
more self-regarding reasons for their movement—and indeed,
for their particular faction or organization—to survive.
Whether they crave some measure of political power or whether
they seek the satisfaction of seeing like-minded individuals affect the larger political environment, they are unlikely to want
their investment in a particular organization to dissipate.99
Moreover, their own well-being, including access to the necessities of life and support in eluding capture, depends to some extent on the organization in which they have invested.100 Finally, as Bruce Hoffman observes, terrorist organizations are
subject to a process of natural selection, which constantly
weakens or even decimates those that do not focus on the importance of their own survival.101
96. Id. at 28.
97. See BERGEN, supra note 30, at 392 (discussing the pressures placed on
the organization as a result of “the loss of Afghanistan as a base, and the U.S.led campaign to detain members of jihadist movements around the world”).
98. See ROBERT PAPE, DYING TO WIN: THE STRATEGIC LOGIC OF SUICIDE
TERRORISM 20–24 (2005) (describing the strategic, social and individual logic
behind terrorist organizations).
99. See infra notes 129–35 and accompanying text.
100. See supra Part I.B (discussing the importance of public approval for
the survival of al Qaeda).
101. See BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 157–84 (1998) (discussing
organizational survival). Though it would be all but impossible to deny the
importance of survival for his own organization, Abu Bakr Naji indulges his
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3. Crafting a Long-Term Plan to Achieve (Surprisingly
Conventional) Strategic Goals
Terrorist organizations have reason to take the long view.
Even by their own admission, they must surmount staggering
difficulties to achieve their political goals, and their tactics
sometimes require feats of extraordinary complexity. They are
marginalized from political power yet crave the authority to
govern.102 Al Qaeda strategists are no exception: they too live
for the future. They emphatically reject the notion that violent
activity is a mere outlet for pent-up frustration.103 Al Qaeda
strategists envision a campaign that will take, at a minimum,
decades.104 Naji’s vision, as summarized by Wright, takes the
following shape:
[J]ihadis [should] continually attack the vital economic centers of [regimes in Muslim countries that cooperate with the West], such as
tourist sites and oil refineries, in order to make the regimes concentrate their forces, leaving their peripheries unprotected. Sensing
weakness, Naji predicts, the people will lose confidence in their governments, which will respond with increasingly ineffective acts of repression. Eventually, the governments will lose control. Savagery will
naturally follow, offering Islamists the opportunity to capture the allegiance of a population that is desperate for order (Naji cites Afghanistan before the Taliban as an example.) Even though the jihadis
will have caused the chaos, that fact will be forgotten as the fighters

evident sense of moral superiority when discussing how Westerners think
about survival:
[W]hat fuels their action are material interests and the desire to survive. Thus, they strive to survive, but it is not just any survival;
rather it is a survival which guarantees for them an unruffled life of
comfort and luxury. As for their allies and those who support them,
they continue and remain steadfast in their coalition with them as
long as (their) interest is served by that alliance. Therefore, we must
understand this very well.
NAJI, supra note 1, at 37 (emphasis added).
102. See NAJI, supra note 1, at 15–22 (discussing the goal of establishing a
caliphate in the Middle East). As one observer notes:
[A]ll terrorists exist and function in hopes of [acquiring the power to
govern]. For them, the future rather than the present defines their
reality. Indeed, they can console themselves that it was only a decade
ago that the British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, said of the
African National Congress, “Anyone who thinks it is going to run the
government in South Africa is living in cloud-cuckoo land.” Exactly
ten years after that remark was uttered, Queen Elizabeth II greeted
President Nelson Mandela on his first official state visit to London.
HOFFMAN, supra note 101, at 184.
103. See NAJI, supra note 1, at 72 (discussing the problem of “idiots”).
104. See id. at 38.
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impose security, provide food and medical treatment, and establish
Islamic courts of justice.105

Surpassing even Naji’s ambition (though overlapping with
his account on key points), Hussein details a twenty-year plan
for al Qaeda beginning with the September 11 attacks. The details of Hussein’s plan bear at least some resemblance to what
the United States has experienced in the succeeding years.106
In a stage that is to last until 2006, Iraq will become the focus
of recruiting for foot-soldiers eager to attack the United
States.107 Subsequently, al Qaeda will turn attention to Syria
and Turkey, while ratcheting up direct confrontation with Israel.108 The organization, gradually transforming itself into a
decentralized social movement, will then be in a position to undermine Arab governments, to bolster its capabilities to deploy
electronic warfare, and to more openly confront the United
States.109
105. Wright, supra note 38, at 56.
106. Id. at 56–58.
107. Id. at 57–58.
108. Id.
109. See id. Suri also celebrated the potential to transform jihadi organizations into the backbone of a more deeply-rooted but decentralized social movement. See BERGEN, supra note 30, at 245 (discussing Suri’s vision of decentralization). In achieving such a goal, Suri seems to have sought not only a
means of enlisting untold numbers into his cause but also of solving (however
imperfectly) the hierarchy-operational security trade-off otherwise pervasively
affecting his movement. Id. “If a Muslim is in Britain he doesn’t need to leave
his job or university and go and fight jihad at the front. What he can do is call
the press agency and tell them I’m from the global Islamic resistance and
claim responsibility for whatever action is being done in the world.” Id. But
achieving this goal is easier said than done. The problem lies in a paradox Suri
and his like-minded pro-decentralization strategists apparently fail to acknowledge. Building a movement requires broad public support, which in turn
requires coordinated operations (particularly violent ones), a task that is
nearly impossible without hierarchy. In principle, it is perhaps not impossible
for al Qaeda and similar entities to innovate in the creation of postmodern organizational forms that combine attributes of hierarchy along with some of the
benefits of decentralization (as when a central leadership sets broad goals that
leave lower-level operatives a measure of flexibility but also constrain their
priorities, and when resources can be spent independently by decentralized
members but allocated centrally). Nonetheless, two observations are in order
about such efforts. First, they are likely to require time, energy, and learning
through mistakes (because of the technical complexities inherent in developing
signaling systems, using technology, and otherwise harnessing the benefits of
hierarchy when decentralization is the norm), thereby introducing large risks
that must be weighed alongside other goals. Second, compelling theoretical
rationales (supported by empirical observation) suggest that, even when organizations innovate in an attempt to achieve benefits of both centralization
and hierarchy, certain inherent limits are likely to interfere with this process.
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While the jihadi strategists differ about when to confront
their political adversaries and how hierarchical to make terrorist organizations, their overarching goals are surprisingly similar. In particular, the terrorist networks appear to harbor not
abstract ideological objectives but rather concrete strategic political and military goals. In some cases, these turn out to be
surprisingly conventional goals relating to the accumulation of
territory and control over commodities such as oil. For example,
Naji writes:
[T]he military goals of our movement in the stage of “the power of
vexation and exhaustion” [are] especially the goal of (making) the enemy withdraw its forces and the forces of its helpers among the apostates from specific targets and making them withdraw from places
where they are present (especially the regions where the masses live
so that we can begin in the stage of the management of savagery.)
(Furthermore), in accordance with the principle of (self ) interest
which the enemy follows . . . we must crown that (effort) by targeting
petroleum sectors since petroleum is the artery of life in the West. . . .
America views [oil] as a primary and vital strategic commodity in war
and a necessity in peace and a requisite for international influence.
The success of targeting the economy of the enemy politically and
militarily is historically well-established . . . .110

Naji makes similar observations regarding the value of territorial control,111 echoing Suri’s emphasis on the importance of
territory as a place to recruit, organize, train, and strategize.112
Admittedly, actors within terrorist networks differ in the
extent of their ultimate aspirations. Some burn with a rage
that will only assuage with vengeance,113 while other participants in the network are more readily motivated by money114 or
Hierarchy depends on formal organizational structures, division of responsibility, authority relationships, and predictable forms of interaction that are generally considered to be the antithesis of decentralization. It is more plausible
to expect that terrorist networks will find a viable means for operational security to exist with somewhat hierarchical arrangements than to expect terrorist
networks to discover some entirely unique means of having their cake and eating it too by simultaneously being centralized and decentralized.
110. NAJI, supra note 1, at 41.
111. See id. at 61 (discussing the value of territory).
112. See Wright, supra note 38, at 50–51.
113. See id. at 52 (“One line of thinking proposes that America’s tragedy on
September 11 was born in the prisons of Egypt. Human rights advocates in
Cairo argue that torture created an appetite for revenge, first in Sayyid Qutb
and later in his acolytes, including Ayman al-Zawahiri.”).
114. See BERGEN, supra note 30, at 154–55 (quoting one of bin Laden’s
most trusted lieutenants in the early al Qaeda organization in Sudan who
stole $110,000 from him); Shapiro, supra note 28 (discussing “greedy” terrorists).
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abstract political and religious convictions.115 In the midst of
these competing agendas, leaders with a strategic vision have
articulated a range of goals that fit onto a continuum, from obtaining control of existing nation-states,116 fomenting broad regime change in the Middle East and creating a caliphate
throughout the region or the Muslim world,117 to engagement
in a long-term military and ideological struggle with the
West.118 The most sophisticated analyses repeatedly bring the
focus back to the concrete indicators of political and military
success that one might expect from a more conventional nationstate adversary.119 Assumptions that terrorist networks seek as
their primary objective to undermine Western values may distort our capacity to appreciate how they might respond to familiar costs and benefits relating to the achievement of conventional political and military goals.120
4. Subtle Parallels Between Terrorist Networks and State
Bureaucracies
If there is any image that epitomizes modern national security discourse, it is that of a faceless, lawless terrorist cabal—
endlessly adaptable and antithetical to conventional rule-bound
bureaucracies. Yet Lawrence Wright’s exhaustive study of al
Qaeda’s origins again confounds such imagery. In its stead,
Wright traces an image of an entity almost desperate for Weberian, rule-bound bureaucratic structure:
The leaders of al-Qaeda developed a constitution and by-laws, which
described the utopian goals of the organization in clear terms: “To establish the truth, get rid of evil, and establish an Islamic nation.”
This would be accomplished through education and military training,
as well as coordinating and supporting jihad movements around the
world. The group would be led by a commander who was impartial,
resolute, trustworthy, patient, and just; he should have at least seven
years of jihad experience and preferably a college degree. Among his
duties were appointing a council of advisors to meet each month, establishing a budget, and deciding on a yearly plan of action. One can
appreciate the ambition of al-Qaeda by looking at its bureaucratic

115. See BERGEN, supra note 30, at 98–99 (interviewing a Libyan recruit
about his ideological motivations for joining al Qaeda).
116. See supra Part I.B.
117. See NAJI, supra note 1, at 15–22.
118. See Wright, supra note 38, at 56.
119. See id. at 57–58.
120. See supra note 32 (comparing the Bush administration’s assertions
about the motivations of terrorist networks with a more scholarly historical
analysis of terrorist groups).

CUELLAR_4FMT

2007]

6/1/2007 11:24:07 AM

AL QAEDA’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

1331

structure, which included committees devoted to military affairs,
politics, information, administration, security, and surveillance.121

This picture of an embryonic al Qaeda, steeped in legalisms
and bureaucratic procedures, showcases the importance terrorist networks assign to institution-building. Time and again,
terrorist leaders ponder how to simultaneously solve their most
pressing short-term management problems, while instilling a
sense of shared mission among members and forging procedures achieve their organizations’ longer-term goals. Indeed,
perhaps the most common recurring theme in the jihadi strategic studies concerns the central importance of creating a structure to solve organizational challenges. How should camps be
run? Who should decide what operations are undertaken? Who
makes decisions about how best to resolve disputes? How
should work be delegated? How should differing opinions be
harmonized? While a terrorist network’s specific operational
challenges are distinctive, its larger organizational dilemmas
are not.
To see this, consider how the jihadi strategic studies emphasize the importance of service-delivery to the growing populations they expect to control.122 Some strategists recognize the
need for effective administrative cadres to manage oversight
responsibilities and particularly to ensure the delivery of services to civilian populations that come under the organization’s
control.123 Not surprisingly, al Qaeda’s vision of eventually administering the security, sustenance, and economic needs of a
population would encompass the same burdens that a conventional public agency would encounter in providing services, including the need to recruit competent staff and to respond to
the needs of the population being served. And crucial among
these burdens is the need for managers. As Naji notes:
[We have a need for] a large number of elements who have administrative experience, especially in the first periods of the management
of savagery. Of course, we have previous experience from managing
our organized groups. However, when we settle in the regions, our
administrative elements will not be sufficient with respect to numbers for managing these regions, whose large numbers of residents
will take us by surprise. The regions of savagery should be managed
by us and by the people who live in them.124

121. WRIGHT, supra note 31, at 142.
122. See Wright, supra note 38, at 56.
123. NAJI, supra note 1, at 63.
124. Id. Note that Naji offers a somewhat more elaborate vision than al
Zawahiri’s, which hints at the ability of a terrorist network to take over a
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Notwithstanding al Qaeda’s ultimate and radically antiWestern goals, the basic insight ought to be familiar to anyone
involved in planning for post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq or
similar settings on behalf of the U.S. government.
Of course, the administrative cadres to which Naji refers
are just one type of expert. In order to manage the period of
“savagery” that Naji foresees and effectively provide services to
civilians, the strategist readily anticipates the need for al
Qaeda to deploy even more specialized expertise:
One of the brothers said to me . . . “This [territorial expansion] is not
the way that will take us to our goals. Assuming that we get rid of the
apostate regimes today, who will take over the ministry of agriculture, trade, economics, etc.?”. . . . [I]t is not a prerequisite that the
mujahid movement has to be prepared especially for agriculture,
trade, and industry. One even sees that the movements and the parties
which come to power in the world govern on the basis of their political
constituents. They appoint ministers from within the party or the
movement for managing the different ministries and for taking
charge of general policy for each ministry in accordance with the general policy of the state. As for the one who manages the techniques in
each ministry, he can be a paid employee who has no interest in policy and is not a member of the movement or the party. There are
many examples of that . . . .125

Many examples, indeed: unfamiliar though his context may be
to external observers, Naji might as well have been providing a
theoretical account of representative politics and bureaucratic
delegation that underlies the conventional administrative
state.
Solving management problems is relevant not only when
terrorist networks enter their hoped-for “management of savagery” phase. Taxing Western resolve, seeking organizational
survival, and executing their long-term plan to create the preconditions for the management of savagery all require resources and recruits.126 Achieving these objectives requires calibrating violence and navigating the devilishly difficult tradestate’s administrative apparatus essentially intact. See supra Part I.B.; cf. Andrew Rathmell, Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq: What Can We
Learn?, 81 INT’L AFF. 1013, 1022 (2005) (discussing the problems that followed
from U.S. planners’ apparent assumption that they could take over the Iraqi
government’s administrative apparatus essentially intact). In contrast, Naji
appears more willing to recognize service delivery and governance as a staggering challenge. NAJI, supra note 1, at 63.
125. NAJI, supra note 1, at 63 (emphasis added). As for the time it would
take to explain, a semester’s worth of administrative law would probably do
the trick.
126. Id.
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offs between operational security and innovation on the one
hand and centralized control on the other. From an instrumental perspective, jihadist leaders would therefore view some of
the challenges faced by public organizations and their leaders
with considerable familiarity before the “management of savagery” phase.
Intricate contextual details unquestionably affect how any
collective entity fashions an instrumental response to its organizational problems. Yet the underlying internal organizational
problems have a common root, even in staggeringly different
contexts. Public bureaucracies routinely face agency problems
involving the alignment of goals between principals (political
actors or agency managers) and agents.127 Jihadi strategists
foresee similar challenges, given the ambitious nature of their
goals and the frequently demonstrated temptation of lowerlevel operatives to skim financial resources.128 Both types of organizations must adjudicate disputes and explicitly turn to legal procedures to do so.129 Like public bureaucracies, al Qaeda
and its analogues also face the problem of restraining overzealous action. The language of some jihadi strategic studies even
eerily parallels words in American judicial opinions recognizing
the importance of administrative mechanisms to mitigate such
overzealous behavior.130 Commonalities emerge as well in how
terrorist networks and public bureaucracies in the U.S. public
law system—faced with the need to restrain overzealous action
while harnessing expertise131—view management through
127. See KAREN M. HULT & CHARLES WALCOTT, GOVERNING PUBLIC ORPOLITICS, STRUCTURES, AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 15–24
(1990) (describing characteristics of the different models of the organization as
a political system).
128. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing examples of
“greedy” terrorists).
129. See, e.g., BERGEN, supra note 30, at 124–25 (discussing al Qaeda’s use
of Sharian courts to legitimize its decisions); HULT & WALCOTT, supra note
127, at 44–45 (discussing prominent adjudicative structures within public organizations). Although both types of entities deploy formal legal rules, it is unsurprising that an illicit nonstate entity does so less frequently given the lack
of a larger social, political, and bureaucratic context that would enable it to
more fully acquire the attributes of a conventional nation-state.
130. See NAJI, supra note 1, at 61 (discussing the need to restrain certain
groups from being excessively aggressive); Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Auditing Executive Discretion, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 227, 258–60 (2006) (discussing the role of judicial review in restraining overzealous action among public
bureaucracies).
131. See, e.g., Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574 (1952)
(“[I]n cases raising issues of fact not within the conventional experience of
GANIZATIONS:
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strict and hierarchically imposed rules. Terrorist networks face
an even more difficult trade-off than public bureaucracies in
contending with hierarchy. This is because formal bureaucratic
hierarchies value carefully administering scarce resources, a
practice which can lead to particularly pronounced security
problems.132 But more striking than the distinctions in the intensity of the dilemma is the reality that such profoundly different types of organizations as public bureaucracies and terrorist networks nonetheless view hierarchy and formal rules as
both a blessing and a curse.
Finally, although some strands of conventional wisdom regard terrorist organizations as entirely unconstrained by public
reactions,133 a closer examination reveals that both public agencies and terrorist networks seek to build public approval and
gain legitimacy.134 Terrorist networks can be constrained by
their audiences in two crucial ways. First, leaders’ tactical and
egotistic political objectives depend on the internal support of
participants, and that dependence requires leaders to employ
strategies that engage and reward these constituents.135 Second, the appeal of a terrorist network to the public (particularly
in Middle Eastern countries) is pivotal because it cultivates
greater organizational support and assuages opposition to the
group’s objectives.136 This connection between public support
judges or cases requiring the exercise of administrative discretion, agencies
created by Congress for regulating the subject matter should not be passed
over.”); NAJI, supra note 1, at 25 (“[I]n our plan we open the door of management wide to those who have mastered its art.”).
132. See BERGEN, supra note 30, at 244–46 (discussing Suri’s critique of
hierarchy).
133. See Nzelibe & Yoo, supra note 35, at 2533 (contending that “terrorist
organizations face . . . no political accountability for their foreign policy failures,” and that therefore “they can afford to ignore their domestic audiences
and take more aggressive stances in initiating international conflict”).
134. Compare Kallstrom v. Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1065 (6th Cir. 1998)
(discussing the value of transparency and public accountability for both the
judicial and executive branches), and DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF
BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY 366 (2001) (stating that much of the FDA’s present
power is derived from the public legitimacy and prestige that it gained early in
its history as it “acted to stem vast consumer crises in adulterated medicines”),
with NAJI, supra note 1, at 21 (“[T]he masses . . . will be our support in the future, provided that there is transparency in this plan and even an acknowledgement of error sometimes.”).
135. See Brachman & McCants, supra note 56, at 315 (discussing the internal power struggles within terrorist organizations).
136. See NAJI, supra note 1, at 63–64 (discussing the importance of popular
support in establishing a successful Islamic revolution). Indeed, al Qaeda
strategists recognize that the need for public support extends not only to what
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and the mitigation of internal management problems may
explain why some of the most contentious disagreements
among terrorist leaders involve the question of how to cultivate broader public support.137 It also explains why leaders
temper their authoritarian impulses for tight control and security with an approach that values the legitimacy created by
law-like administrative procedures.
Ignoring the terrorist networks’ public constraints may distort counter-terrorism policy by downplaying the value of and
potential for driving a wedge between terrorist leaders and
their actual or potential supporters. Juxtaposing conventional
public bureaucracies from advanced industrialized nationstates with nonstate actors deploying terrorist tactics is counterintuitive. Yet both share a tangle of common organizational
problems that provide insights into the nature of strategic conflict which transcend the more superficial ideas about terrorist
networks that prevail in much of the current political discourse.
As with any analogy, certain limits govern the comparison
between problems confronting modern terrorist networks and
those that bedevil conventional, rule-bound state bureaucracies. Illicit nonstate actors must sometimes adopt more costly
organizational strategies than legitimate governmental agencies. For example, the risk of detection may force a terrorist
leader to confer greater independence to subordinates than
would otherwise be desirable.138 Furthermore, illicit organizations must do without a formal legal system. With few exceptions, they lack the depth of expertise and bureaucratic capacity of a nation-state.139 Public bureaucracies in advanced
industrialized countries rarely face the range of constraints
that terrorist networks do, leaving agency leaders with a
broader range of options to solve their bureaus’ management
problems.

the jihadi movement would have to achieve during the “management of savagery” stage, but also to what the organization would need at a more embryonic stage in the development of a terrorist network. See BERGEN, supra note
30, at 392 (quoting al Zawahiri’s call to win over greater public support for al
Qaeda); supra note 124 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 38, at 53.
138. See Jacob N. Shapiro & David A. Siegel, Underfunding in Terrorist
Organizations (Nov. 3, 2006) (unpublished manuscript at 7, on file with author).
139. NAJI, supra note 1, at 63.
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In the end, a more nuanced analysis reveals critical commonalities that are at least as important as the differences.
Both terrorist networks and our own bureaucratized nationstate must strike a balance between hierarchy and expertise,
simultaneously drawing on the strengths of each while trying
to minimize their dependence on them.140 Both must reconcile
the potential disconnect between low-level players and their
superiors.141 Both must deal with problems involving bounded
rationality and tunnel vision.142 And both must encourage participation while maintaining critical operational attributes such
as secrecy and restraint.143 In light of these parallels, what
makes terrorist strategists such as Naji particularly insightful
is that they recognize that many of their movement’s strategic
goals—including the exploitation of imperial overstretch and
the survival of organizational structures—all depend on the
fate of the network’s administrative capacity.144
If one casts aside the more superficial descriptions of terrorist organizations, certain tentative implications begin to
emerge. Jihadi terrorist networks simultaneously seek to
achieve ambitious goals, such as provoking Western overstretch
or competing with established governments in delivering services to civilian populations while facing complicated organizational realities. This combination of environment and aspiration gives rise to recurrent administrative law-type problems—
140. Compare HARMONY AND DISHARMONY, supra note 40, at 12–13 (noting
that the balance between hierarchy and expertise must be struck as a consequence of security concerns), with HULT & WALCOTT, supra note 127, at 92–93
(explaining that bureaucracies exist to develop organizational expertise, but
that hierarchy is often imposed as a means of enhancing accountability).
141. Compare HARMONY AND DISHARMONY, supra note 40, at 19–21 (discussing how terrorist groups deal with the problem of “preference divergence”
within their membership), with MARCH & SIMON, supra note 77, at 13–14 (discussing the preference divergence problem more generally in the context of
large legitimate organizations).
142. Compare NAJI, supra note 1, at 71 (complaining of operatives who
cannot conceive of undertaking small missions instead of larger ones), with
MARCH & SIMON, supra note 77, at 173–74 (discussing how departmentalization can lead to the emergence of subgoals which limit the overall rationality
of agency actions).
143. See BERGEN, supra note 30, at 245–46 (outlining Suri’s lecture on the
importance of a decentralized cell structure as a mechanism for maintaining
secrecy and security); NAJI, supra note 1, at 71 (“[T]he desire for large actions,
especially battle, overcomes the minds of some . . . enthusiastic people . . . . However, one of its harmful effects is that it moves them to scorn actions that are not large.”).
144. NAJI, supra note 1, at 23.
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problems borne from the amount and complexity of coordinated
effort that leaders must expend to achieve their objectives in a
complicated world,145 and similar to those concerns existing at
the core of domestic administrative law in a nation such as the
United States. The problems involve delegation and oversight,
expertise, participation, restraint of overzealous action, and adjudication of disputes.146 Much like the managers of state bureaucracies in advanced industrialized countries, the nominal
leaders of terrorist networks cannot assume the existence of optimal institutional conditions such as the alignment of the
goals of low-level operatives with those of strategic decision
makers. They must instead forge that alignment from the imperfect materials available to organizational entrepreneurs:
raw recruits, imperfect monitoring strategies to oversee the
work of low-level operatives, limited financial resources, and
the ability to devise rules and standards that embody organizational goals.147 A more nuanced view of institutional dynamics
reveals the organizational complexity of illicit nonstate actors
who aim simultaneously to exhaust Western resolve, to ensure
organizational survival, and to execute an ambitious long-term
plan for achieving territorial control. This complexity undermines the assumptions made by some scholarly observers of
terrorism-related legal developments.148 Just as it is dangerous
to assume that public agencies routinely achieve their stated
goals, policymakers should be wary of presumptions that terrorist networks have routinely solved their own organizational
problems. We should instead turn our attention to learning
from al Qaeda’s administrative law dilemmas, so that we might
better address our own.
II. LEARNING FROM AL QAEDA’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
DILEMMAS
Having traced some of the themes that appear in the works
of al Qaeda strategists, we can now use them to evaluate potential changes to our own law and policy. In particular, we can
observe how the recurring themes emphasize certain features
of terrorist networks that are sometimes overlooked when poli-

145. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., REPORT ON
REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 1 (Comm. Print 1960).
146. See MARCH & SIMON, supra note 77, at 2.
147. See id.
148. See, e.g., supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
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ticians shape public perceptions. Since politicians’ craft their
statements and policy pronouncements to appeal to the public’s
prevailing views,149 conventional assumptions about the uniform zeal of terrorist organizations, their time horizon, their interest in using weapons of mass destruction, and their aptitude
for working in secrecy may confound our collective ability to
manage terrorist risks at a reasonable cost. As an alternative to
the more common, truncated depiction of terrorist networks in
discussions about appropriate legal and policy responses, this
Part discusses some of the implications that arise from dissecting al Qaeda’s administrative law-related problems.
A. AGENCY PROBLEMS AND INFORMATION GAPS
One challenge permeating the administrative state involves gaps in information.150 Political actors in the legislatures
and the executive branches of such states face substantial uncertainty. How is the Food and Drug Administration using its
regulatory powers? How reliable is the Department of Homeland Security’s rationale for deciding not to process asylum applications from certain countries? What is the best way of
changing the public’s nutritional or highway safety practices?
To manage these problems, the administrative state balances
the benefits of discretion with those of review.151 It provides for
deferential judicial review of executive branch decisions, forces
Congress to delimit the bureaucracy’s powers so courts can
monitor agency activities,152 and grants private parties the limited right to learn about government policies through the Administrative Procedure Act and the Freedom of Information
Act. These measures survive in the U.S. system because politicians think the measures can reduce agency problems and (to a
lesser extent) because the public occasionally supports such
policies.153
149. Cf. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The International Criminal Court and
the Political Economy of Antitreaty Discourse, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1597, 1629
(2003) (“[P]oliticians’ treaty-related rhetoric shapes public opinion, but that
opinion in turn shapes what politicians choose to emphasize to please key constituencies.”).
150. See, e.g., 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 46, at 416–17.
151. See Frug, supra note 29, at 1301–02.
152. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (requiring Congress to make a clear textual commitment of authority to agencies
whenever it “alter[s] the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme”).
153. See McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure
Act, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 180, 215 (1999) (arguing that Congress enacted the
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For the leaders of terrorist networks, the information predicament is exacerbated by the rudimentary nature of their internal procedures and by the constraints of their security environment.154 Nowhere is this more apparent than in the
recurring problem of managing people and money to ensure action in accordance with the network’s overall goals. Time and
again, the strategists of terrorist organizations recognize that
some members are motivated in part by the possibility of personal gain. For example, in 1999, leaders asked for an accounting from a Yemeni cell leader who had been provided with
funds. In response to the report provided, he received the following email from Ayman al Zawahiri, already one of al
Qaeda’s major figures:
With all due respect, this is not an accounting. It’s a summary accounting. For example, you didn’t write any dates, and many of the
items are vague. The analysis of the summary shows the following:
1-you received a total of $22,301. Of course, you didn’t mention the
period over which this sum was received. Our activities only benefited
from a negligible portion of the money. This means that you received
and distributed the money as you please . . . 2-Salaries amounted to
$10,085—45 percent of the money. I had told you in my fax. . . . That
we’ve been receiving only half salaries for five months. What is your
reaction or response to this? 3-Loans amounted to $2,190. Why did
you give out loans? Didn’t I give clear orders to Muhammad Saleh
to . . . refer any loan requests to me? We have already had long discussions on this topic . . . .155

Such bickering over financial resources belies the stereotypical image of terrorist networks that are uniformly populated by cadres of operatives desperately eager to die for their
cause. Instead, the picture that emerges from such exchanges is
one of a network capable of raising considerable sums of money
but uncertain about how, by whom, and to what degree of efficacy that money will be used. If the Yemeni leader had actually
portrayed the stereotypical perception of a religious zealot
whose only purpose is to serve a dark organizational master,
then Zawahiri’s exasperated email hinting at the misuse of
funds would hardly have been necessary.156 In other examples,
APA in order to control the actions of agency administrators who might be appointed by presidents of the other political party).
154. See HARMONY AND DISHARMONY, supra note 40, at 11; Shapiro &
Siegel, supra note 138, at 6.
155. HARMONY AND DISHARMONY, supra note 40, at 42; Cullison, supra
note 50, at 62, 64.
156. This is similar to a long-running federal case involving the financial
mismanagement of Indian funds which features a federal judge displaying
similar degrees of exasperation with federal officials. Cf. Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
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strategists almost seem to take pains to excuse their less-thanperfect supporters (while suggesting that the transgressions of
those supporters should be kept secret), reinforcing the stereotype of the monolithic terrorist organization.157
Ironically, even the early history of al Qaeda amply reveals
its leadership’s pragmatic bent. During the 1980s, when the organization’s leadership was holed up near Khost, Afghanistan,
bin Laden and his allies recognized that many potential recruits would seek something more than spiritual deliverance.
In response they designed an employment program that provided for members’ decidedly material needs:
Al Qaeda held its first recruitment meeting in the Farouk camp near
Khost, Afghanistan. . . . New recruits filled out forms in triplicate,
signed their oath of loyalty to bin Laden, and swore themselves to secrecy. In return, single members earned about $1,000 a month in salary; married members received $1,500. Everyone got a round-trip
ticket home each year and a month of vacation. There was a healthcare plan and—for those who changed their mind—a buyout option:
They received $2,400 and went on their way. From the beginning, alQaeda presented itself as an attractive employment opportunity for
men whose education and careers had been curtailed . . . .158

Al Qaeda’s leadership certainly would welcome the opportunity to dispense with the monetary incentives. In the process,
it could avoid depending on anyone other than individuals who
are entirely committed to the organization’s cause.159 The terrorist leaders may even agree with James Landis’s observation
that “[t]he prime key to the improvement of the administrative
process is the selection of qualified personnel. Good men can
make poor laws workable; poor men will wreak havoc with good
laws.”160
But those improvements are easier said than done. Most
individuals harbor mixed motives for engaging in political activity.161 Once the religious rhetoric is privately put aside, some

Judge Lamberth’s Reign of Terror at the Department of Interior, 56 ADMIN. L.
REV. 235, 241 (2004) (describing a judge’s discontent with the Treasury and
Interior Departments, leading to multiple contempt proceedings).
157. NAJI, supra note 1, at 35 (warning leaders not to criticize the imperfections of their volunteers, and telling them to avoid publicizing errors).
158. WRIGHT, supra note 31, at 141–42.
159. HARMONY AND DISHARMONY, supra note 40, at 42–43 (advising
against the removal of less committed operatives and strengthening the network as a result).
160. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., REPORT ON
REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 66 (Comm. Print 1960).
161. See MARCH & SIMON, supra note 77, at 83–85.
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supporters of jihadi movements are especially happy if the organization provides them with an opportunity for financial
gain, but may become cautious or unreliable if they feel exposed to personal danger.162 Even if the world were filled with a
large number of individuals who would be fanatically loyal al
Qaeda members, it would not obvious who they were. Almost
any successful effort to identify them would require placing
them in positions of intermediate responsibility and observing
their performance.163
Moreover, al Qaeda not only needs adherents, but also requires expertise and resources. The network must sift through
pools of potential recruits to find collaborators who can raise,
transfer, and administer financial resources; who can forge a
communications strategy; and who can procure commodities
such as explosives or weapons. Thus, the organization expands
its recruitment circle beyond those who are most intensely
committed to the organization.164 Weapons and explosives traffickers, money launderers, communications specialists, individuals with valid documents or the ability forge them, and
those with experience living in Western countries are all likely
to display a mix of loyalties, including those to their own material and personal well-being.165 And the most radical and loyal
adherents might be drawn into particularly sensitive or specialized roles, such as serving on suicide missions, that would preclude their generalized use through out the network. For all
these reasons, the organization confronts repeated and perva-

162. See Shapiro & Siegel, supra note 138, at 13 (“[T]he longer individuals
remain in [a terrorist] organization, and the further they move up the management structure, the more likely they are to place a heavy weight on monetary rewards. . . . [T]he threshold level of risk acceptance and commitment required for participation in support activities is much lower than for
participation in technical roles.”).
163. See MARCH & SIMON, supra note 77, at 59–61. But see HARMONY AND
DISHARMONY, supra note 40, at 15.
164. See NAJI, supra note 1, at 63; Shapiro & Siegel, supra note 138, at 11–
12.
165. These agency problems, moreover, make it easier to understand the
jihadi strategic studies’ frequent focus on the importance of ideological indoctrination. E.g., NAJI, supra note 1, at 59; Wright, supra note 38, at 48. However, even that strategy is unlikely to ensure organization-wide orthodoxy. See
MARCH & SIMON, supra note 77, at 59–61 (noting that departmentalization
leads to the creation of subgoals which may not further the overall organizational objectives).
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sive problems arising from the divergence between the organization’s goals and the goals of some of its operatives.166
The tensions that arise from this disconnect are merely an
example of a more general problem. Incomplete information
limits the ability of the leaders of a terrorist network to assess
the network’s current tactical position. Those leaders have difficulty acquiring precise information about the potential effects
of the group’s attacks on the political and military environment, the progress made by adversaries in the pursuit of major
leaders, and the activities and whereabouts of subordinates.167
Information gaps hinder the organization’s efforts to set strategic goals and work toward them. These gaps also create obstacles to resolving basic management problems such as those
arising from the operation of training camps or in the planning
of responses to potential enforcement operations. From a more
parochial perspective, factions within the organization need information to better manage political competition.168 These information needs are analogous to our own system, which is why
so much of modern administrative law deals with creating institutional mechanisms that produce information that justifies
particular regulatory decisions, and why information can have
such strategic value for both military and political adversaries.169
Much like agencies within the administrative state, a terrorist network seeks to counter its information problems in a
166. Cf. Cuéllar, supra note 130, at 261 (observing that while there are
times when the good conscious of administration officials will sometimes contribute to action which is in line with institutional objectives, “such desirable
circumstances do not always arise”).
167. See HARMONY AND DISHARMONY, supra note 40, at 47; Shapiro &
Siegel, supra note 138, at 6.
168. See MARCH & SIMON, supra note 77, at 150 (noting that in intraorganizational conflicts, problem solving requires an exaggerated emphasis on
information assembly).
169. STEPHEN PETER ROSEN, WINNING THE NEXT WAR 253–55 (1991) (highlighting how uncertainty about the military capabilities of rival nations
prompted the U.S. military to develop information through simulations); Erik
Lichtenberg & David Zilberman, Efficient Regulation of Environmental Health
Risks, 103 Q.J. ECON. 167, 167 (1988) (discussing environmental regulators’
uncertainty as to the extent of the risks associated with environmental contaminants); Thomas W. Gilligan & Keith Krehbiel, Collective Decision Making
and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive
Amendment Procedures, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 287, 287–88 (1987) (discussing
the impact of information gaps on the incentives of politicians to organize the
legislature into committees, and to defer to the judgments of those committees).
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variety of ways. It could seek to promote broader participation
to obtain more information; however, this would create additional security problems. It could attempt to infiltrate its enemies.170 But, given the scarcity of operatives able to live unobtrusively in the West,171 finding those capable of infiltrating
Western security agencies would be very difficult. It could target individuals with special analytical capacities for recruitment. Ultimately, however, none of these approaches would entirely solve the problem: the environment is too complicated
and even the most sophisticated organizations can only respond
imperfectly to such uncertainty.172
As a result, terrorist networks such as al Qaeda remain
vulnerable to strategies designed to exploit their information
gaps. Their burden is a consequence of simultaneous pressures
to operate secretly while managing broader organizational
problems that can be mitigated through hierarchy, expertise,
and broader participation. In the course of walking this tightrope, leaders of terrorist organizations almost inevitably create
networks of people with heterogeneous motivations.173 The
presence of individuals who are motivated by greed or personal
political ambition also belies the assumption that terrorist
networks are monolithic institutions, driven uniformly by religion and ideology.174 In fact, reality is more complicated. Terrorist leaders must shoulder the burdensome cost of identifying
zealous recruits while dealing with the security problems associated with its dependence on essential, though less reliable,
foot soldiers.
The prevalence of mixed motives among illicit organizations leaves policymakers with a chance to drive a wedge between participants in terrorist ventures. Policymakers should
value counter-terrorism policies that leave less-reliable mem170. See NAJI, supra note 1, at 52 (calling on the movement to infiltrate all
institutions associated with its enemies).
171. See Cullison, supra note 50, at 61.
172. See Shapiro, supra note 28, at 2 (indicating a trade-off between solving
information problems and promoting security).
173. See HARMONY AND DISHARMONY, supra note 40, at 43. To avoid creating a pool of new recruits with heterogeneous motivations, leaders would have
to incur two sets of costs: exceedingly elevated expenses screening potential
participants, and high opportunity costs borne from excluding from participation eager individuals with expert knowledge, skills, personal contacts, or material resources that can be valuable to the leaders’ vision of the organization.
174. Address to the Nation on the War on Terror, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 597, 1598 (Sept. 11, 2006) (“[T]hey form a global network of extremists
who are driven by . . . totalitarian ideology . . . .”).
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bers of terrorist organization in place (particularly if the members can be monitored) instead of detaining them. Allowing
such operatives to stay in the organization forces al Qaeda to
contend with a rank-and-file membership that is not fanatically
committed to the group.175 Enforcement practices that fail to
consider the implications of removing the less reliable elements
in the al Qaeda network can unwittingly aid the organization
by effectively assuming the burden of separating the wheat
from the chaff. As long as less reliable operatives remain readily observable (and, if necessary, subject to interception), focused surveillance may be a better strategy than a policy of detention that alerts the organization to enforcement activity and
helps it identify its most valuable members.176 Another way to
exploit terrorist networks’ agency problems would be to credibly communicate to less devoted terrorists the rewards they
might enjoy in exchange for betraying the group.177
B. CENTRALITY OF PUBLIC APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL
Like administrative bureaucracies, terrorist networks depend on public approval to achieve both near-term goals of surviving, and longer-term instrumental goals of undermining proWestern Middle Eastern regimes. Accordingly, popular support
in the Muslim world is a critical asset to al Qaeda, its affiliates,
and the broad social movement the organization wishes to
spawn. Indeed, the desire of some al Qaeda strategists to found
such a movement echoes the desire of some regulatory officials
in advanced industrialized countries to achieve their policy
goals by leveraging public support.178
175. See Shapiro & Siegel, supra note 138, at 32–33.
176. HARMONY AND DISHARMONY, supra note 40, at 42. Cf. Neal K. Katyal,
Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1381 (2003) (calling for higher sentences on co-conspirators playing a minor role in a scheme to perpetrate illegal
activity, without considering the extent to which such penalties align the incentives of the minor players and the ringleaders).
177. See id. at 43 (advocating providing an easier out for lower tier operatives than “indefinite detention or death”).
178. See DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT 388–89 (2001) (providing
an example of a regulatory official pursuing a strategy of fostering broad social
support). Former FDA Commissioner David Kessler was considering potential
policies for curbing tobacco use when he had the following insight:
I also began to think about the importance of removing the vestiges of
social acceptability from tobacco in order to prevent future generations of children from becoming addicted to nicotine. I knew that
changing priorities and attitudes, and ultimately creating new norms,
is a far more complex task than achieving legislative victories, but in
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It follows for some strategists that their plans are especially threatened by the prospect of successful U.S. government
efforts to counter the network’s plans to build public support.
Suri notes that the American “war of ideas” has had at least
limited success in spurring modification of textbooks in some
Muslim countries.179 This success greatly rankles him, and he
emphatically calls on adherents to promote Salafi jihadism as a
response.180 More generally, public supporters provide nearly
all resources on which the organization relies, from financial
backing to foot soldiers to safe houses. At the same time, Western public opinion is also crucial. It may create pressure on
Western governments to withdraw from the Muslim world, but
is also a potentially vindictive force that strategists must not
overly provoke.181 This tension forces al Qaeda and its sympathizers to conduct operations that generate enough publicity to
spur recruitment and financial support without alienating the
Middle Eastern general public; likewise they must provoke exhaustion rather than outrage among the public in the West.
Al Qaeda’s leadership is not ignorant of these parameters.
For example, Naji emphasizes the centrality of a “media plan”
to any successful operation. This plan should
target[ ] and focus[ ] on two classes. The first class is the masses, in
order to push a large number of them to join the jihad, offer positive
support, and adopt a negative attitude toward those who do not join
the ranks. The second class is the troops of the enemy who have lower
salaries, in order to push them to join the ranks of the mujahids or at
least to flee from the service of the enemy.182

Avoiding wanton and excessive brutality is crucial to the
success of this media strategy. Such brutality can provoke sympathy for al Qaeda’s enemies or give rise to such intense outrage among Western audiences that “success” could imperil the
the end that is probably what it takes to reduce rates of smoking.
Id. at 388. A generation earlier, the Federal Narcotics Bureau, “faced with a
non-supportive environment and a decreasing budgetary appropriation that
threatened its survival, generated a moral crusade against marihuana use
which resulted in the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act and the alteration of
a societal value.” Donald T. Dickson, Bureaucracy and Morality: An Organizational Perspective on a Moral Crusade, 16 SOC. PROBS. 143, 143 (1968).
179. Wright, supra note 38, at 51.
180. Id.
181. See BERGEN, supra note 30, at 392 (“[W]hat [many jihadist strategists]
are saying about September 11 is that the attacks may have been a tactical
victory, but they were a strategic disaster because of the overwhelming response it provoked.”); supra Part I.B.1 (discussing the strategy of provoking
imperial overstretch).
182. NAJI, supra note 1, at 21.
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organization.183 Ayman al Zawahiri espouses this principle, evidenced by his warning to the late al Zarqawi to curtail his brutality.184 In shaping American public opinion, their key goal is
to promote fatigue among the population—to make the public
question why the U.S. government is spending lives and
money.185
Carefully calibrating the amount of brutality is also crucial
because too much violence can alienate the terrorist network’s
most important pool of potential support. Among Muslims in
the Middle East—al Qaeda’s primary audience—the terrorist
network’s leaders seek desperately to evoke sympathy and support. They endeavor to increase the flow of donations and recruits. They seek allies and sympathizers to smooth the organization’s work and to promote efficient administration.186 The
thorniest predicament for the leaders therefore emerges anew
in nearly every strategic decision: how to achieve sufficient
public notoriety without unleashing the sort of backlash that
followed the two American embassy bombings in Africa, the organization’s earliest attacks against high-profile targets. As
Lawrence notes:
Muslims all over the world greeted the bombings with horror and
dismay. The deaths of so many people, most of them Africans, many
of them Muslims, created a furor. Bin Laden said that the bombings
gave the Americans a taste of the atrocities that Muslims had experienced. But to most of the world and even to some members of alQaeda, the attacks seemed pointless, a showy act of mass murder
with no conceivable effect on American policy except to provoke a
massive response.187

The public support enjoyed by a terrorist organization has
a direct impact on its ability to solve the nettlesome management problems that interfere with its ability to accomplish its
goals. Having greater public support facilitates building exper183. Brachman & McCants, supra note 56, at 312–13.
184. Wright, supra note 38, at 53 (“Zawahiri advised Zarqawi to moderate
his attacks on Iraqi Shiites and to stop beheading hostages. ‘We are in battle,’
Zawahiri reminded him. ‘And more than half of this battle is taking place in
the battlefield of the media.’”).
185. Moreover, note how concern for public perceptions should naturally
translate into a desire to develop bureaucratic and administrative mechanisms that both control operations and restrain excesses. See NAJI, supra note
1, at 9 (“If the number of Americans killed is one/tenth the number of Russians killed in Afghanistan and Chechnya, they will flee, heedless of all else
[because] . . . [t]hey [have] reached a state of effeminacy which [makes] them
unable to sustain battles for a long period of time . . . .”).
186. See supra Part I.B.4.
187. WRIGHT, supra note 31, at 272.
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tise within the network because a larger base of support is
more likely to produce skilled and knowledgeable recruits who
would otherwise have to be carefully trained or hired at rates
calculated to ensure loyalty. Greater public support also fills
the network’s coffers, allowing it to fund new activities, to
enlarge its circle of supporters by providing services and security, and to mitigate its internal management problems by occasionally using money to purchase valuable expertise or services.188 Deeper and broader support can also mitigate internal
dispute resolution problems by making individual members
more fungible, particularly the low- and mid-level operatives on
which any organization depends.189 As the organization becomes less dependent on a smaller group of individuals, it no
longer has to please members that would otherwise have been
able to veto operations.190
Certain policy implications follow from terrorist networks’
thirst for public support. To further their long-term goal of dislodging U.S. influence in the Middle East, al Qaeda and its allies gain in the short-term by drawing U.S. forces into the region. Insurgents and terrorist networks can lure U.S. forces
into using tactics, such as those inflicting collateral damage,
that draw the ire of Arab and Muslim communities.191 Thus,
U.S. policymakers should weigh the potential reaction of the
Muslim public among other factors as they craft counterterrorism strategies.
The opposite point is unlikely to be lost on strategists for al
Qaeda and its allies, whose unquestionably ruthless zeal for
destruction must uneasily coexist with a desire to tire rather
than enrage Western publics.192 Meanwhile, the concern with
188. E.g., MANSFIELD, supra note 67, at 257–58, 313–14; see also Shapiro &
Siegel, supra note 138, at 11–12.
189. See HARMONY AND DISHARMONY, supra note 40, at 15.
190. Cf. MARCH & SIMON, supra note 77, at 61 (observing how organizational leaders can manage some of their problems by recruiting members to
whom work can be delegated).
191. E.g., Kim Gamel, Troops Kill 20 in Iraq Clash, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 9,
2006, at A5; Jason Straziuso, U.S. Night Raid Harms Afghans’ Trust, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2007, at A5 (providing examples of how American military responses to actual or perceived terrorist tactics have yielded civilian casualties); Press Release, U.S. Cent. Command, Civilians Wounded by Anti-Iraqi
Mortar Attacks (Dec. 21, 2006) (on file with author); see also RICKS, supra note
8, at 332–35 (noting how insurgents were able to provoke the First Battle of
Falujah and the ensuing collateral damage).
192. See HOFFMAN, supra note 101, at 155 (noting the danger, from the
perspective of terrorist groups, that adverse publicity of severe terrorist at-
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tiring rather than indefinitely infuriating American public
opinion suggests greater nuance and complexity in potential
terrorist motivations to use weapons of mass destruction.193
Some strategists aim to engage in sufficient violence to attract
public support among some sympathetic Muslim and Arab
groups,194 while avoiding the most punishing tactics that might
risk creating sympathy for Westerners or even provoking a
maximally brutal response imperiling the entire movement.195
And just as leaders may be able to exploit divisions in the motives of individuals working within these organizations, policymakers may be able to confound terrorist drives for recruits
and public support by choosing policies that contradict negative
assumptions about the U.S. which are rampant in the Arab and
Muslim world.196
U.S. policymakers must contend with public opinion not
only in the Middle East, but also among their own constituents.
In the process, they must consider the possibility that, by seeking to dilute public resolve, terrorist networks accurately perceive an important feature of the interaction between the costs
of using force and the constraints associated democratic institutions. Democracies are more likely to force their leaders to
equilibrate the costs of a policy of military intervention with its
perceived benefits.197
Whether democracy can force policymakers to learn from
terrorist networks’ organizational vulnerabilities is a different
tacks “helps an outraged public to mobilize its vast resources and produces information that the public needs to pierce the veil of secrecy all terrorist groups
require”); supra note 130 and accompanying text (discussing overzealous action and the need to restrain it among terrorist organizations).
193. These complexities are not routinely appreciated even by some commentators on national security. See, e.g., John M. Burkhoff, The Fourth
Amendment and Terrorism, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 911, 925 (2005) (claiming
without support, not only that “terrorist individuals and organizations undoubtedly seek to obtain chemical, biological, and nuclear materials” but that
they do so “to assist in their assaults”); supra note 35 and accompanying text
(discussing the trade-offs terrorist organizations face in deciding whether to
use nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons).
194. See NAJI, supra note 1, at 15 (discussing the importance of public support in the “path to the establishment of an Islamic state”).
195. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (discussing overzealous action).
196. See ZACHARY SHORE, BREEDING BIN LADENS: AMERICA, ISLAM, AND
THE FUTURE OF EUROPE 5 (2006) (citing polls and concluding that “America’s
appeal in the Muslim world has rarely been lower”).
197. James D. Fearon, Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of
International Disputes, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 577, 577, 586–87 (1994).
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question. Although policymakers have plenty of principled reasons to train attention on the organizational problems affecting
terrorist networks’ competition for public support, the last five
years suggest that U.S. officials have not always taken these
insights seriously.198 It may take time, bureaucratic capacity,
or additional political support to fully appreciate the implications of these insights. And political dynamics may distort even
the most determined efforts to develop more effective counterterrorist policies.199
Ultimately we must await history’s judgment on whether
U.S. policymakers have sufficiently mined the organizational
complexities of al Qaeda and its analogues. But three facts suggest that U.S. policymakers and the sprawling bureaucracies
they supervise have yet to advance far enough on this path.
First, much of their public rhetoric about al Qaeda in particular, and about terrorist groups in general, fits poorly with the
insights arising from a close observation of al Qaeda’s ongoing
administrative law dilemmas.200 Second, some of the strategies
the U.S. government has pursued play into the terrorist network’s hands by dovetailing almost precisely with its explicitly
avowed strategies.201 Third, in order to apply some of the insights that can be gained from studying al Qaeda’s organizational problems, we must ensure that our own bureaucracies
are capable of assimilating such information and evaluating
policies using new metrics sensitive to those insights. In keeping with such a focus, the September 11 Commission report
called for greater capacity to analyze open sources.202 Yet build198. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 46, at 365–83 (stating that
the “U.S. government must build the capacities to prevent a 9/11-scale plot
from succeeding” and making a series of recommendations with respect to several countries with perceived terrorist threats); RON SUSKIND, THE ONE PERCENT DOCTRINE 342 (2006) (“It’s five years after 9/11 [and] the country still [is
not able] to tell everybody what [it] know[s] about the strategic targeting doctrine of al Qaeda.”).
199. Cf. Bueno de Mesquita, supra note 57, at 29–30 (discussing politicians’
incentives to provide less stringent counter-terrorism policies that might be
optimal under certain conditions); Cuéllar, supra note 20, at 44–48 (discussing
politicians’ potential incentives to signal competence by undertaking visible
and aggressive actions while neglecting activities with longer-term payoffs).
200. See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text (discussing distinctions
between political and scholarly discussions of terrorist motivations).
201. See Wright, supra note 38, at 59.
202. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 46, at 407–19 (discussing
the importance of developing analytical capabilities to analyze both opensource and covertly obtained information, and of integrating such information).
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ing such capacity, and repairing what ails existing intelligence
bureaucracies, is only the tip of the iceberg. Security bureaucracies would deliver greater social value if they eschewed their
tendency to analyze the threat of terrorism in the abstract. Instead, analysts’ focus should turn to the question of how specific legal and policy changes affect terrorists’ organizational
vulnerabilities, and whether the steps our society has taken
reasonably advance its security or instead play precisely into
the hands of terrorist networks. Such capacity seems, at best,
embryonic.203
C. AL QAEDA’S DRIVE TO SOLVE ITS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
DILEMMAS
Even a brief observation of terrorist organizations demonstrates that these entities lack a fully functioning analogue to
the familiar administrative law framework found in the United
States and other advanced industrialized countries. As nonstate actors, terrorist networks have a limited ability to fully
appropriate the functional architecture of nation-states.204
Nonetheless, aligning the incentives of lower-level operatives
and organizational leaders, restraining overzealous action endangering the organization’s standing with the public, and
maintaining operational confidentiality are all examples of organizational challenges that have encouraged some al Qaeda
strategists to aspire to imitate the administrative structures of
state bureaucracies in advanced industrialized countries.205
In some cases, strategists have begun to realize their ambition for law-like administrative procedures within the terrorist
network. Al Qaeda’s increasingly frenetic pace of operations
displays evidence of occasional attempts not only to address internal administrative problems, but also to attempt to do so
through the creation of a law-like system of adaptive procedures. Though embryonic as an administrative process, the
components of these systems seem to rely on a flexible mix of

203. Witness, for example, the Justice Department’s relative lack of detailed theoretical or empirical analysis when its officials made the case for renewal of portions of the Patriot Act that were subject to sunsets. Cf. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, USA PATRIOT ACT: SUNSETS REPORT (2005) (identifying the expiring provisions of the Patriot Act and providing analysis and argument for their
renewal).
204. It is worth noting, however, that their leaders repeatedly voice the aspiration to acquire such capacity. See supra Part I.B.4.
205. See NAJI, supra note 1, at 73.
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hierarchy (whenever possible) and loose decentralization
(whenever necessary),206 audits of lower-level officers,207 efforts
to require specialization,208 dispute resolution bodies to administer Islamic law,209 and a decidedly Weberian effort to match
individuals to tasks on the basis of skill.210 Al Qaeda’s leaders
have embraced delegation—providing guidance and leaving logistical planning and financing to regional officials.211 An employment contract for potential recruits explains how the organization has developed administrative procedures for
handling grievances and disputes that arise under Islamic
law.212 Reviewing what al Qaeda has already accomplished,
Naji emphasizes what the organization has learned regarding
the value of sorting recruits by intellectual ability and competence,213 the successful division of responsibilities within al
Qaeda units,214 and the creation of promotion systems to reward those who invest in acquiring administrative skills.215
The organization’s most exalted instrumental goals, he reiterates at every turn, depend on procedures that will build on
these developments, providing the organization with the means
to make the most effective and legitimate use of its scarce resources.
If administrative procedures are important for the internal
management of terrorist networks, they are even more important for the provision of services to external constituencies.
Perceptive strategists within terrorist networks recognize the
value of bureaucratic administration and service delivery. They
seek more than tentative steps toward a formal internal administrative process—particularly during or immediately following
periods of intense violence—and recognize that these steps are
among their most difficult, complex, and pressing challenges.
In order to manage such challenges, al Qaeda’s strategists seek
206. See id. at 23.
207. See Shapiro, supra note 28, at 2.
208. See NAJI, supra note 1, at 23.
209. See BERGEN, supra note 30, at 123–25 (discussing al Qaeda’s use of
Sharian courts).
210. See NAJI, supra note 1, at 23, 72.
211. See HARMONY AND DISHARMONY, supra note 40, at 8.
212. Id. at 69 (summarizing Harmony Document AFGP-2002-600045, an al
Qaeda employment contract which, inter alia, lays out “[p]rocedures for handling grievances and disputes . . . in accordance with Islamic law”).
213. See NAJI, supra note 1, at 72.
214. See id. at 23.
215. See id.
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to develop administrative cadres with special competence to
manage organizational units.216 They also seek experts to run
the equivalent of cabinet-type ministries, and in some cases
they openly advocate the study of Western management
texts.217 In contrast to some U.S. military planners, these
strategists worry not only about the proverbial day of, but also
about the day after.218
Underlying this concern is the recognition that administrative capacity is essential both to overseeing the operations of
the network itself (including, among other things, the planning
of terrorist operations and the training of new recruits), as well
as to providing services to civilians in order to maintain their
allegiance. The process begins with brutality:
When savagery happens in several regions—whether we administer
them or they are neighboring regions or further away—a spontaneous
kind of polarization begins to happen among the people who live in
the region of chaos. The people, seeking security, rally around the
great personages of the country or a party organization or a jihadi organization or a military organization composed of the remainders of
the army or the police of the regimes of apostasy.219

But it culminates in al Qaeda’s version of the administrative
state, where success depends on
management of . . . needs with regard to the provision of food and
medical treatment, preservation of security and justice among the
people who live in the regions of savagery, securing the boarders [sic]
by means of groups that deter anyone who tries to assault the regions
of savagery, as well as setting up defensive fortifications. (The stage
of ) managing the people’s needs with regard to food and medical
treatment may advance to (the stage of ) being responsible for offering
services like education and so forth.220

While Naji’s is perhaps the most elaborate and organizationally sophisticated vision associated with those who support
the burgeoning movement that al Qaeda represents, it is worth
noting that not every jihadi strategist is equally sensitive to the
centrality of service delivery and administrative challenges.
Take al Zawahiri’s Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner. The
senior al Qaeda leader stresses the value of recruiting new adherents, publicizing the movement, and mobilizing supporters,
using these goals as a strategic justification for massive terror216. See id. at 1, 63.
217. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing the value of
Western management texts to al Qaeda).
218. Cf. RICKS, supra note 8, at 184.
219. NAJI, supra note 1, at 47.
220. Id. at 11.
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ist attacks directly against the West.221 By contrast, he pays little attention to the challenge of administering security and service delivery in areas where existing state authority collapses.
He assumes, instead, that the state will simply fall into the jihadists’ hands after allegedly unpopular, pro-Western regimes
begin to fail:
The jihad movement must adopt its plan on the basis of controlling a
piece of land in the heart of the Islamic world on which it could establish and protect the state of Islam and launch its battle to restore the
rational caliphate based on the traditions of the prophet.222

There is an uncanny similarity between this assumption
and some U.S. war planners’ assumptions about Iraq. Perhaps
the canny aspiration of some al Qaeda strategists to forge
greater internal administrative capacity, and particularly a
greater capacity to provide services to civilians during and after
violent conflict, should be cause for reflection among U.S. policymakers and citizens. Despite the importance of post-conflict
reconstruction, the U.S. government and its allies have confronted major problems in forestalling civilians’ descent into
despair in Afghanistan and Iraq. To improve the nation’s capacity to manage these challenges, U.S. policymakers may need to
forge new bureaucratic structures and international coalitions
better able to address the security and service delivery challenges that jihadi strategists have rightly underscored.
But despite the unquestionable need for some bureaucratic
improvements in conventional nation-states’ security and humanitarian capabilities, the most cogent implication to draw
from terrorist networks’ organizational problems may not be
about the need to change our domestic administrative arrangements. The most important point may be a more subtle
one; whatever their degree of apparent ideological commitment
and political audacity, even terrorists must overcome vast organizational challenges to achieve their goals. As the next Part
details, this ineluctable pervasiveness of organizational problems—problems that have motivated both advanced industrialized nation-states and terrorist networks to seek rule-like
mechanisms for managing administrative burdens—suggests
221. See MANSFIELD, supra note 67, at 349–50.
222. Id. at 214. In contrast to Naji, al Zawahiri provides considerably less
evidence when discussing the objective of territorial control of the complex
service-delivery challenges that would confront the organization, particularly
in the transitional period before security could be established. Nonetheless, al
Zawahiri does recognize that the organization (as opposed to the state he
hopes to create) faces administrative challenges.
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that the tactical game of counter-terrorist law and policy is embedded within a longer-term, strategic struggle among competing systems to manage administrative problems.
III. STRATEGIC CONFLICT AS A DUEL AMONG
COMPETING SYSTEMS TO MANAGE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS
Return to the now-familiar debates about specific legal
changes in the wake of the September 11 attacks. These debates are familiar not only because of the significance of the legal changes in question, but also because the discussions tend
to rely on three familiar approaches. One focuses on the potential tactical advantages that a new statute or constitutional interpretation would yield in the battle to detect potential terrorist activity,223 another on the new policy’s effect on civil
liberties,224 and a third on trying to weigh the tactical advantages against the intrusions.225 Though each of these approaches has something to offer,226 each also neglects a more
institutionally sensitive approach to evaluating the appropriate
legal response to national security risks—an approach that
emerges more clearly from the following insight. Despite their
staggering differences, state bureaucracies in advanced industrialized countries and terrorist networks such as al Qaeda
have something in common. Administrative problems are endemic to both, and hierarchical, law-like arrangements have
been appealing (in varying degrees) to both. Neither commonality should be surprising upon reflection—achieving ambitious
goals is all but impossible except through organized action, and
undertaking such action without a measure of hierarchy and
process is profoundly difficult. It follows that strategic competition is partly about the performance of administrative systems,
and in particular, about how well those systems manage organizational problems. Even when competition occurs between
seemingly radically different adversaries, such as advanced industrialized countries and terrorist networks, in some respects
the underlying conflict might resemble a duel among adminis-

223. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
224. See David Cole, The Priority of Morality: The Emergency Constitution’s
Blind Spot, 113 YALE L.J. 1753, 1759–60 (2004).
225. Cf. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 33, at 1110–14.
226. In fact, some of the preceding discussion falls squarely within the first
trope. See supra Part II.B.
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trative systems designed to lift an entity closer to achieving its
goals while managing internal organizational problems.
To see how this insight applies in the continuing struggle
against al Qaeda and similar groups, recall how time and
again, problems that fall under the purview of administrative
law in the American system prove central to terrorist networks’
capacity to manage strategic conflicts.227 These problems include restraining overzealous action, managing disputes among
political actors, harnessing expertise, and weighing the costs
and benefits of organizational activity. These very problems
also help determine our own government’s ability to respond to
the threats posed by terrorist networks. Managing them depends in part on the organization of military bureaucracies.
Budgetary priorities also matter, as do specific regulatory
strategies that can enhance the security of transportation infrastructures, chemical plants, and nuclear facilities.228
Legal arrangements are a critical ingredient allowing advanced industrialized countries to manage such administrative
problems, and for good reason. Although adherence to legal
procedures depends on a measure of symbiosis with political
circumstances and social practices, the procedures themselves
plainly aim to strike a balance between flexibility and hierarchy.229 They provide a framework for resolving disputes. They
create procedural mechanisms to promote enhanced bureaucratic performance and restrain overzealous action. These advantages are not lost on some al Qaeda strategists; even when
they lack the elaborate social arrangements and ability to operate openly that facilitates the implementation of legal rules
as such, al Qaeda leaders have at various times aspired to create quasi-legal arrangements to better manage their endemic
administrative burdens. Ironically, some government policies
undermining existing legal arrangements in advanced industrialized countries may seem attractive only because of excessively simplistic depictions of terrorist networks. Policymakers
and observers sometimes describe a ruthlessly efficient, entirely decentralized yet centrally coordinated, technologically
227. See supra Part I.B.4.
228. Cf. Eric A. Posner, Fear and the Regulatory Model of Counterterrorism, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 681, 689–90 (2002).
229. See Leather Indus. of Am. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 40 F.3d 392, 402
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (“An agency has discretion to design rules that can be broadly
applied, sacrificing some measure of ‘fit’ for administerability.”); BREYER, supra note 2, at 77–78.
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sophisticated terrorist entity staffed monolithically by equally
committed, zealous operatives with a common vision.230 Instead, the reality of al Qaeda and similar networks exposes this
description as a mirage—terrorist operatives manage to pose a
threat not because of, but despite, their inability to fully address their pervasive administrative problems with hierarchical legal arrangements reminiscent of our own.
No entity with ambitious policy goals can avoid the recurring problem of how best to organize administrative activity to
deliver services to members or external constituents. In some
cases, severe problems in these domains persist for both al
Qaeda and the United States, such as Iraq-style challenges of
bureaucratic management in post-conflict situations where violence continues while services must be delivered. But the U.S.
legal-bureaucratic system the post-conflict management problem is an exceptional one. Typically, the most pressing administrative challenges are gradually resolved in our own nationstate—perhaps not to perfection, but to a significant degree.
The familiar administrative arrangements characteristic of
modern regulatory policy not only reflect, but epitomize the
qualities associated with advanced industrialized democratic
states. U.S. law, for instance, reflects a broader trend among
advanced industrialized nation-states to manage agency problems through some degree of legislative and judicial monitoring.231 The U.S. regulatory state leverages organized interests’
capabilities through bureaucratized notice and comment arrangements that permit participation and reshape those
groups’ relationships to the resulting regulation.232
Far from being orthogonal to the struggle against adversaries such as al Qaeda, these features of the bureaucratized
nation-state can be critical ingredients for strategic success.
Nation-states and terrorist networks face pervasive organizational dilemmas regarding how best to organize people, committees, and scarce resources to achieve complicated goals in an
unpredictable world. In the American public law system, lawmakers facing political pressures and seeking to achieve their
230. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
231. See Cuéllar, supra note 130, at 249–50. For a discussion of the development of administrative arrangements in other advanced industrialized
countries, see, e.g., Jeeyang Rhee Baum, Presidents Have Problems Too: The
Logic of Intra-branch Delegation in East Asian Democracies, 37 BRIT. J. POL.
SCI. (forthcoming Oct. 2007) (on file with author).
232. See McNollgast, supra note 153, at 213–15.
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own goals have been largely responsible for creating the modern administrative law system. They have done so in response
to organizational dilemmas making it difficult to monitor and
restrain government agencies. Despite its occasional prescriptive limitations, the basic system of administrative law that
politicians have forged (along with associated legal doctrines
and bureaucratic practices) addresses some of the most nettlesome dilemmas a nation-state faces. These include resolving
disputes that embroil political actors,233 allowing political actors to anticipate the public’s reaction to administrative decisions,234 mitigating agency problems,235 allowing the executive
branch to credibly signal its competence to a skeptical public,236
and administratively weighing the costs and benefits of particular actions.237 Because these administrative arrangements
are capable of serving such crucial functions, they constitute a
strategic resource of sorts. Diluting or dismantling these arrangements in order to achieve tactical goals can exacerbate
problems that interfere with responses to a nation’s adversaries.
Despite its politicized origins, the modern administrative
law system has become a framework for crafting legal and policy decisions in a manner that mitigates some of the pervasive
bureaucratic problems affecting politically controversial and
factually complex decisions.238 Such complexity arises not only
233. See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 812–13 (1997) (adjudicating a
dispute involving legislators’ standing to challenge an executive branch administrative action).
234. See McNollgast, supra note 153, at 186 (“The positive political analysis of administrative law generates some ideas about the policy effects of administrative procedures.”).
235. See id.
236. Enhancing executive branch discretionary powers and limiting judicial review of national security actions may weaken the executive’s ability to
credibly signal competence and good faith. Cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, Bureaucratic Decision Costs and Endogenous Agency Expertise 3–5 (June 26,
2006) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/stephenson
.pdf.
237. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (1993).
238. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 170–71 (2002) (discussing how “[t]he new administrative state created a
multitude of problems,” and explaining the procedural and legal reforms that
mitigated the difficulties). It should be readily apparent that administrative
law is neither entirely rational nor balanced. As a product of the political process, its tenets reflect the particular distribution of political strength and
weakness channeled into the lawmaking process. And because they are enmeshed in that larger political process, legal provisions associated with admin-
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in traditional regulatory contexts,239 but also in the field of national security.240 Because of this complexity, Professor Cass
Sunstein underscores the practical relevance of the administrative law model—with its proscriptions on arbitrary decision
making, its flexible logic of delegation and deference, and its
increasing emphasis on cost-benefit analysis—for problems
traditionally involving national security.241 This approach is
eminently sensible given the difficulties public bureaucracies
face in resolving national security problems in light of the need
for a measure of discretion in this domain.242 Moreover, in principle modern national security law is concerned with limiting
arbitrariness. The arbitrary exercise of national security power
has the potential to waste resources, provide a false sense of seistrative law do not operate in a vacuum by themselves; they are instead acted
upon in large measure because the existing political equilibrium makes it
costly for various players to ignore the doctrine. Nonetheless, although legal
arrangements do not function by themselves in the absence of norms and enforcement mechanisms, part of what makes advanced industrialized countries
distinctive is that administrative law arrangements survived political efforts
to address organizational problems that afflict public bureaucracies. The intense litigation, legislative conflict, executive branch interpretive disagreements, and scholarly debate concerning the definition of different legal provisions integral to administrative law is a testament to its importance in our
system. Though it is plain that rules, by themselves, would not have the same
impact within loose networks of illicit activity, the key point is that terrorist
leaders have reason to seek the creation of law-like procedures to govern organized activity, regardless of whether such organizations have the necessary
social and political context to make such procedures easy to impose. Indeed,
such organizations tend to face precisely the circumstances that make following procedures difficult, including the need to operate in secrecy, the inability
to recur to a formal legal system to enforce contractual arrangements, and the
risk that seemingly loyal operatives will tend to have competing motives.
239. See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57
ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 412–18 (2005) (discussing the complexity of regulatory
policymaking).
240. See Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 2663, 2663–64 (2005) (concluding that the United States should evaluate
the authorization to use military force under administrative law).
241. Id. at 2672.
242. One may sensibly disagree with Sunstein’s willingness to use this
“administrative law at war” approach as a justification for expansive deference. Quite likely, some differences of opinion on this issue might be rooted in
the extent of deference considered appropriate even within more traditional
confines of administrative law. Compare Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury:
The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2582–84
(2006) (exalting deference), with Cohen et al., supra note 21, at 743–45 (questioning rationales for deference in conventional administrative law), and
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Auditing Executive Discretion, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 227, 261–65 (2006) (detailing the risks associated with expansive discretion).
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curity, provoke a backlash, or engender unnecessary restrictions on individual autonomy. These problems are no less serious merely because potential restraints on the arbitrary use of
executive power can interfere with tactical operations.243
The National Security Agency (NSA) wiretapping controversy further illustrates the argument. Late in December of
2005, a newspaper revealed that President Bush had signed an
order in 2002 directing the NSA to “monitor[] the international
telephone calls and international e-mail messages of hundreds,
perhaps thousands, of people inside the United States without
warrants,” in an effort to gather intelligence on al Qaeda.244
President Bush quickly expressed regret—not that he signed
the order, but that news of it leaked.245 The newspaper article
constituted a “shameful act,” he said, adding that “the fact that
we’re discussing this program is helping the enemy.”246 That
same day, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and General Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy Director for National Intelligence, held a press briefing concerning the wiretapping program.247 Although refusing to confirm details of the story,
Gonzales stressed the program complied with the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness standard for warrants.248 Hayden
explained that the judgment to warrant “targets” was “made by
the operational work force at the National Security Agency using the information available to them at the time, and the
standard that they apply—and it’s a two-person standard that
243. Even if one leaves aside the direct benefits of hierarchical bureaucracy
and external promotion of bureaucratic capacity in the short-term, the question remains whether matching the relatively greater decentralization of terrorist networks would actually serve the advanced industrialized nations strategic goal of responding to terrorist attacks. Greater decentralization implies,
by definition, less control over critical decisions such as the projection of coercive force. Given scarce resources, more decentralization runs the risk of excessively spreading those resources, which is precisely what some terrorist
networks’ strategic studies emphasize as a crucial objective. See supra note 77
and accompanying text (discussing the goal of rendering Western powers less
effective by spreading their resources).
244. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1.
245. Edward Epstein, Bush Plays Hardball on Spying, Patriot Act, S.F.
CHRON., Dec. 20, 2005, at A1.
246. Id.
247. Press Release, White House, Briefing by Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales and General Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy Director for National Intelligence (Dec. 19, 2005) [hereinafter Press Release], available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-1.html.
248. Id.
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must be signed off by a shift supervisor.”249 Hayden later clarified that the judgments had “intense oversight by the NSA Inspector General, by the NSA General Counsel, and by officials
of the Justice Department who routinely look into this process
and verify that the standards set out by the President are being
followed.”250
Critics have ardently questioned the administration’s legal
basis for ordering the NSA to engage in wiretapping activities
in contravention of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 (FISA).251 Indeed, the administration has tacitly acknowledged that the wiretapping program violates FISA on its face,
conceding that the Act “requires a court order before engaging
in this kind of surveillance . . . unless there is somehow—there
is—unless otherwise authorized by statute or by Congress.”252
In FISA’s own terms, the statute is, together with the criminal
wiretap statute, “the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance . . . and the interception of domestic wire, oral, and
electronic communications may be conducted.”253 The structure
of FISA essentially creates an administrative review system for
presidential decisions to use national security-related authorities to wiretap. To this end, FISA creates a Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC) as the means for secretly reviewing
and approving wiretap requests.254 These requests must show
probable cause that the wiretapping target is “a foreign power
or an agent of a foreign power,” and must be approved by the
Attorney General and certified by a high-ranking defense official.255 Critics have questioned the administration’s asserted
need to avoid FISC. FISA provides for retroactive warrant applications and FISC has rejected only a handful of applications
since its inception.256 Some observers sympathetic to the administration’s rationale nonetheless emphasize how the court’s
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. FISA of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
252. Press Release, supra note 247.
253. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f ) (2006).
254. See 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (Supp. III 2005).
255. Katherine Wong, Recent Development, The NSA Terrorist Surveillance Program, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 517, 518 (2000).
256. David Johnston & Neil A. Lewis, Defending Spy Program, Administration Cites Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2005, at A20 (noting that of the 10,617
warrant applications the court received from 1995 to 2004, the court rejected
only four).
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“cumbersome submission requirements and insistence on strict
adherence to the law” result in “the government regularly
withdrawing or modifying applications when it appeared the
judges might disapprove them.”257
Administration representatives emphatically maintained,
however, that the wiretapping was rendered legal by a combination of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force and
the President’s inherent constitutional authority. “History,” its
declarations contend, “conclusively demonstrates that warrantless communications intelligence targeted at the enemy in time
of armed conflict is a traditional and fundamental incident of
the use of military force authorized by the AUMF.”258 The administration’s preferred analogy is between detention and surveillance, emphasizing the Supreme Court’s holding in Hamdi
that detention was authorized under the AUMF because it is
an “inherent part of warfare.”259 The administration argues
that because “signals intelligence is even more a fundamental
incident of war,” surveillance is therefore implicitly authorized
by the AUMF.260 From this perspective, the AUMF “does not
lend itself to a narrow reading,” and represents an explicit endorsement by Congress of “the President’s use of his constitutional war powers.”261 Thus, the administration argues that the
AUMF transferred the war on terror from a “zone of twilight”
to a situation in which the President is at the “zenith” of his
powers.262
Second, the administration has argued that “[t]he NSA activities are supported by the President’s well-recognized inherent constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief and sole
organ for the Nation in foreign affairs to conduct warrantless
surveillance of enemy forces for intelligence purposes to detect
and disrupt armed attacks on the United States.”263 Under this
view, the AUMF merely “confirm[s]” the President’s constitutional authority, as “intelligence gathering is at the heart of ex-

257. Id.
258. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT 2
(2006) [hereinafter DOJ WHITE PAPER], available at http://news.findlaw.com/
hdocs/docs/nsa/dojnsa11906wp.pdf.
259. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 515 (2004).
260. Press Release, supra note 247.
261. DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 258, at 11.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1.
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ecutive functions.”264 Thus, authorization of the NSA wiretapping program is “primarily an exercise of the President’s authority as commander in chief during an armed conflict that
Congress expressly has authorized the President to pursue.”265
Both of the administration’s claims are speculative at best.
To the extent the enacting congressional coalition intended
anything specific, it did not likely intend the AUMF to supersede FISA. Critics have argued that FISA is designed to regulate all NSA efforts to intercept transnational communications,
and that there is no clear basis for believing that the legislature viewed the AUMF trumping such an explicit and wellestablished program.266 These critics have further noted that
Congress amended FISA five times after 9/11, indicating congressional intent for the statute to continue to govern wiretaps.267 Additionally, the Congressional Research Service has
argued that “[w]hile the collection of intelligence is also an important facet of fighting a battle, it is not clear that the collection of intelligence constitutes a use of force,” as authorized under the AUMF.268
Critics also dispute that the President has constitutional
authority, under Article II, to permit warrantless wiretapping.
They note that, given the number of Congress’s enumerated
powers that touch on foreign affairs, “Congress under Article I
plainly enjoys the power to decide what measures the government should take against its enemies within and abroad.”269 As
the Congressional Research Service indicates, “The statutory
language in FISA . . . and the legislative history of the bill that
became FISA . . . reflect the Congress’s stated intention to circumscribe any claim of inherent presidential authority to conduct electronic surveillance . . . so that FISA would be the exclusive mechanism for the conduct of such electronic
surveillance.”270
264. Id. at 2, 30.
265. Id. at 31.
266. John Cary Sims, What NSA Is Doing . . . and Why It’s Illegal, 33
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 105, 132 (2006).
267. Id.
268. ELIZABETH B. BAZAN & JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT WARRANTLESS ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE TO GATHER FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION 35 (2006), available
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/m010506.pdf.
269. Harold J. Krent, The Lamentable Notion of Indefeasible Presidential
Powers: A Reply to Professor Prakash, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1383, 1394 (2006).
270. BAZAN & ELSEA, supra note 268, at 27.
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Three things stand out about the administration’s justifications for the existing surveillance program. First, the administration’s justifications focus relatively little on the marginal
security benefit gained from circumventing FISA, rather than
complying with its requirements. Second, it offers even less justification of how the strategy disrupts al Qaeda’s strategic
goals, internal structure, and budding administrative law.271
Finally, it presents almost no discussion of how this action
weakens a system that has been relatively successful at avoiding the profound organizational challenges now afflicting al
Qaeda.272 When the President authorized the program in 2002,
he explicitly diluted the administrative review mechanisms
that Congress had created, thereby exacerbating the risks of
principal-agent problems, diminishing the extent to which the
executive could signal its competence to citizens and other
branches of government, and disregarding institutional solutions to disputes between the legislature and the executive
branch. At first, these concerns may seem far removed from
those that should animate a presidential response to a terrorist
adversary. Perhaps an ordinary, short-term tactical justification could still be found for the President’s actions. My point is
simply this: allowing the debate to play out at that level is a
mistake. Whatever else Americans are, they are also institutional architects. It is in the details of this architecture—how it
deals with agency problems and information gaps, what participation means, and how disputes are resolved—that they
might win their battles and reasonably manage their risks.

271. Perhaps intelligence analysts are hard at work doing precisely such
investigations and evaluations behind closed doors. For three accounts questioning the capacity of current intelligence bureaucracies to do so, see THE
COMM’N ON THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE U.S. REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES 3–37 (2005), available at http://www.wmd.gov/report/wmd_report.pdf;
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 46, at 254–77; SUSKIND, supra note 198,
at 192–220. Moreover, if the President had more compelling rationales to support his particular policy, it is likely he could have made a more persuasive
case. Finally, it is not obvious why making such a case about the marginal
benefit of dispensing with the FISA courts would have revealed valuable intelligence to our adversaries.
272. These problems include, among others, the risk that expanding the
scope of executive branch surveillance without some external review mechanism will dilute scarce resources, and that heightened political conflict arising
from executive branch failure to follow statutorily prescribed procedures will
damage the executive’s subsequent credibility when requesting new counterterrorism authority from lawmakers.
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Addressing these risks also depends on recognizing that
transparency and process have costs as well as benefits.273 The
technical soundness of some regulatory policies may benefit
from a measure of discretion, or even secrecy. What makes
modern administrative law potentially valuable as a strategic
resource is not necessarily its level of transparency and procedural complexity. It is the fact that its precepts embody a political compromise that allows policy implementation in a system that mitigates some of the recurring organizational
problems bedeviling both states and nonstate actors.274
Given FISA’s politically complex heritage and organizational impacts, the NSA wiretapping illustrates the potentially
complex and troubling consequences of diluting procedural constraints, particularly when the dilution is premised on a questionable interpretive strategy that ignores existing statutory
enactments. Policymakers should evaluate the consequences of
such a move not only with regard to the potential short-term
tactical advantages it offers for pursuing terrorist networks,
but also with regard to the broader strategic effect of undermining existing institutional solutions to administrative problems, particularly when similar problems repeatedly bedevil
terrorist adversaries. If citizens and policymakers are capable
of recognizing the extent to which organizational capacities
play an important role in responding to external threats, then
it is ironic indeed if they fail to consider the impact of counterterrorism policies on the administrative arrangements that
shape those capacities. Lawyers, judges, and policymakers
should therefore evaluate the NSA wiretapping program not
only in terms of the tactical needs it allegedly serves. They
should also consider its laudable institutional effects on administrative arrangements, that (over time) might otherwise allow
us to avoid the problems our adversary is constantly seeking to
resolve. Legislators are entirely capable of making mistakes,
but it is worth recalling that FISA was created for a reason—
273. Cf. William J. Stuntz, Against Privacy and Transparency, NEW REONLINE, Apr. 7, 2006, available at http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=
20060417&s=stuntz041706 (discussing the negative aspects of government
transparency).
274. Cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual
Plausibility, Procedural Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory
Interpretations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 528, 544–52 (2006) (discussing how more
elaborate procedural arrangements governing regulatory action can mitigate
interpretive disagreements about the meaning of a particular legal text in the
administrative state).

PUBLIC
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one that resonates with tones of administrative supervision in
a complex, bureaucratic state. Insisting that the President follow the most plausible reading of FISA is therefore considerably more than an appeal to formalism, and more even than an
appeal to a particular view of privacy or rights.
Instead, FISA is best understood to encompass a basic insight about the nature of strategic competition among entities
facing organizational problems. Competition among strategic
adversaries—even of those as different as al Qaeda and our
own advanced industrialized state—depends on the soundness
and success of an internal administrative law that matches
immediate tactics with broader strategic goals. Legislative bargaining produced FISA specifically to harness certain qualities
associated with our admittedly imperfect but nonetheless valuable administrative mechanisms. Those qualities include provisions for a form of external review with considerable speed and
secrecy and a means of signaling to the larger public executive
competence in its use of surveillance powers.275 Dismantling
FISA review thus runs the risk of leaving Americans without a
solution to the same type of organizational monitoring and control problem that their terrorist adversaries are trying to solve.
Though it is useful to highlight these common problems,
the argument is not meant to collapse the critical distinctions
between nonstate actors and bureaucratic agencies in advanced
industrialized countries. Neither is it meant to suggest that
every aspect of strategic battles comes down to an entity’s development of its administrative law. Though terrorist networks
and state bureaucracies face similar problems, they also tend to
confront different constraints in solving them. The costs of
screening personnel or the importance of absolute secrecy, for
instance, may be lower for a conventional state bureaucracy
than for an illicit network.276
Rather, the preceding analogy underscores the advantages
of recasting strategic conflicts in part as duels between differ275. Cf. Alistair Smith, International Crises and Domestic Politics, 92 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 623, 633–34 (1998) (displaying a model predicting the behavior
and reactions of nations in crisis).
276. Indeed, conventional nation states are likely to hold over illicit nonstate actors in developing hierarchical bureaucracies, operating with lesssevere secrecy constraints, and building support among (and delivering services to) the mass public. In some sense, the structure of the modern, functioning nation-state has evolved to perform precisely such functions, and may
therefore ultimately pose a greater threat than an illicit non-state actor struggling to solve the most basic organizational problems.

CUELLAR_4FMT

1366

6/1/2007 11:24:07 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[91:1302

ent administrative arrangements. In the United States, American lawmakers and organized interests have built legal arrangements to manage recurring organizational problems. Al
Qaeda members have made their own moves to solve pervasive
organizational problems, and in some cases, these moves have
included drives to create hierarchical arrangements not unlike
those instituted in advanced industrialized countries. To wit:
not all organizations must solve their dilemmas the same way.
Yet no organization can avoid its encounter with a world of
mixed motives, information gaps, and agency problems.
The implication of this comparison is deceptively simple,
but ironically hints at the importance of complexity in evaluating the legacy of the September 11 attacks. It underscores the
importance of thinking carefully about how organizational
problems are being managed among adversaries. It suggests
that the correct way to evaluate the NSA’s warrantless eavesdropping tactics and similar enforcement strategies rests only
partly on the immediate tactical advantage achieved against
the adversary. Instead the evaluation should also include how
the policy affects competition between administrative arrangements—and in particular, whether warrantless surveillance
erodes the legal conventions and administrative arrangements
that Americans have built to solve the challenges that more
frequently bedevil adversaries such as al Qaeda.
CONCLUSION
Legal change is in some measure a product of how actors
who can shape the law discuss the problems they are allegedly
trying to solve, and how they choose to frame a conversation
about the relevant costs entailed in solving those problems. In
the years following the 9/11 attacks, those discussions have
taken place in five subtly interconnected arenas: courtrooms,
legislatures, executive branch offices, scholarly communities,
and the media.277 Americans have witnessed fierce disagreements in those arenas about the methods and even the propriety of consequentialist analysis, and about the extent to which
the danger posed by a nimble, secretive, and ruthlessly effective nonstate adversary justifies reshaping the legal architecture of surveillance or executive power. Yet participants in
277. Cf. FRIEDMAN, supra note 238, at 588–91 (discussing the role of social
change, public perceptions, political developments, and diffusion of ideas
through the media as sources of legal change).
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these debates seldom question the analytic value of the prevailing metaphor of terrorist organizations themselves, one that
repeatedly plays up the allegedly radical distinctions between
our familiar bureaucratic structures and their disaggregated
postmodern entities. Given the stakes in choosing a metaphor
to depict organization of nonstate actors, one should ask
whether the prevailing depiction matches what al Qaeda’s own
strategists describe.
Al Qaeda’s own jihadi strategic studies provide a revealing
portrait of the organization, particularly when they are read
against the backdrop of political scientists’ emerging studies of
terrorists’ organizational dynamics. Although obvious differences arise when comparing an occasionally amorphous nonstate actor to the bureaucratized government of an advanced
industrialized country such as the United States, certain parallels exist between the internal management problems al Qaeda
faces and the problems our own government addresses through
an elaborate body of administrative law. Terrorist networks
struggle to restrain overzealous action, to align the incentives
of leaders and staff, and to promote a sense of public legitimacy
about their goals and strategies. Belying conventional images
of their unrestrained radicalism, al Qaeda and its analogues often enlist technocratic solutions to manage their money, to plan
the delivery of services in territories they control, and to analyze public reactions. But in harnessing such technical knowledge they face considerable difficulties resulting from operational security and recruitment problems. In part because of
these constraints, terrorist strategists often seek internal arrangements—analogous to our own domestic administrative
law—to realize long-term strategic goals. These arrangements
emerge from learning from Western management texts, solving
bureaucratic agency problems, harnessing expertise, generating information and participation, and adjudicating internal
disputes. An investigation of al Qaeda’s continuing efforts to fix
its strategic goals and construct a law-like administrative
framework to achieve them yields a number of tentative policy
implications, including (for example) the conclusion that policymakers should evaluate counter-terrorism policies in part on
the basis of whether these policies assist or hinder the organization’s efforts to foment sympathy and participation among
the Muslim and Arab public.
Ironically, key features of the legal system associated with
the modern regulatory state both reflect and play an important
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role in mitigating the challenges that confront terrorist networks. Terrorists networks, like a conventional advanced industrialized nation-state, face fundamental dilemmas where an
element of hierarchy, bureaucracy, and rule-based norms is
imprescindible. Terrorists do not have formal administrative
law, nor have they developed the social and political norms to
conform to it. But, in contrast to conventional wisdom, their
leaders are hard at work trying to fashion analogous versions.
In effect, organizational success—for both terrorist networks
and bureaucratized nation-states—depends on managing classic administrative law concerns: agency problems, the generation of expertise and information, legitimacy and participation,
and the adjudication of disputes among actors who share
power. By appreciating these parallels, Americans may garner
a richer perspective on the value of their own internal arrangements. They should therefore understand strategic conflicts in part as a contest between dueling administrative arrangements managing risks that can never be entirely
extinguished. And they would do well to evaluate counterterrorism policies in part on the basis of how those policies affect administrative capacity. Viewed this way, the persistent
strategic challenge of managing terrorism-related risks will
more readily resemble a struggle to reasonably mitigate murders, traffic accidents, and occupational safety deaths, and will
less resemble an unrelenting struggle to reduce any possible
danger to zero.

